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Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards on
Public Policy Grounds: Lessons from the Case
Law
ANN C. HODGES*
With the U.S. Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Eastern Associated
Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers District 17,1 the public policy exception to
enforcement of labor arbitration awards is once again prominent on the radar
screen of arbitrators, courts, labor unions, and employers. In its 1987
decision in United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 2 the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to limit the public policy grounds on
which courts set aside labor arbitration awards, but failed to do so.3 The
Court in Eastern Associated Coal granted certiorari to resolve the very same
issue that it declined to address in Misco: should arbitration awards be
*Professor of Law, University of Rjchmond. The author thanks her colleague
Professor Leslie M. Kelleher for her valuable comments on the sections of the article
dealing with jurisdiction and venue. Any errors are attributable to the author. In addition,
she acknowledges the research assistance of Lisa R. Butler, Relenee Cook, Craig J.
Curwood, Michele D. Henry, Cindy L. Pressley, Tracey Watkins, and Stephen C.
Williams.
1 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available
at No. 98-2527, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19944, cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1416 (Mar. 20,
2000) (No. 99-1038). In Eastern, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision
upholding an arbitration award that reinstated a mobile equipment operator who had
tested positive for drugs for the second time. Id. at *3-*5. Without analysis, the court
concluded that "the district court correctly decided the issues before it." Id. at *5. The
district court found that while there was a policy against the use of illegal drugs by
employees in safety-sensitive jobs, there was no public policy against reinstatement of
employees in such jobs who have tested positive for drugs in the past. E. Associated Coal
Co. v. United Mine Workers Dist. 17, 66 F. Supp. 2d 796, 805 (S.D. W. Va. 1998).
2 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
3 The Court granted certiorari because of division in the courts of appeals as to the
standard for setting aside arbitration awards on public policy grounds. Id. at 35. The
Court declined to address the argument that no arbitration award could be overturned
absent a conclusion that the arbitration award violated positive law or required a violation
of positive law because it decided the case on other grounds. Id. at 45 n.12. The Court
reemphasized that public policy warranting reversal of an arbitrator's decision must be
"well-defined and dominant" and "ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents,"' not "general considerations of supposed public interests." Id. at 44 (quoting
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers, 461 U.S.
757, 766 (1983)). The Court concluded that the court of appeals' formulation of public
policy did not meet this test. Id. at 44. Furthermore, the Court found that the court of
appeals improperly engaged in its own fact-finding in the course of analyzing the public
policy issue. Id. at 44-45.
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vacated on public policy grounds only when the arbitration award violates
positive law or requires unlawful conduct by the employer, or should a
broader standard for vacating those arbitration awards apply?4 Even if the
Court resolves the issue of the scope of the standard, public policy challenges
to arbitration awards will continue to be raised. While not large in absolute
numbers,5 public policy challenges remain important because they threaten
the finality of labor arbitration awards.6 As David Feller has pointed out,
labor arbitration and commercial arbitration have reversed roles in recent
years.7 While it was difficult to enforce arbitration agreements in the
commercial context when Taft-Hartley was passed, today labor arbitration
decisions are judicially voided more easily than commercial decisions. 8
Public policy challenges are important outside the labor arbitration
context as well. The public policy standards developed in ·labor arbitration
cases have been utilized by courts in reviewing commercial and employment
law arbitration awards.9 Thus a review of public policy challenges in the
labor arbitration context provides lessons for arbitration in other areas as
well. In light of the renewed judicial interest, as evidenced by the Supreme
Court's decision to grant review, and the growth of employment arbitration,
an analysis of judicial review of labor arbitration awards on public policy
grounds is timely.
A review of the case law demonstrates that most of the labor arbitration
awards challenged on public policy grounds involve reinstatement of
discharged employees. This article analyzes 138 private sector federal cases
4

Summary of Cases Granted Review, 68 U.S.L.W. 3585 (2000).

5 Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal

Couns: Facts and Figures, 45 (1) ARB. J. 35, 44 (1990) (stating that during the 19601988 period only 73 of 1,043 post-arbitration appeals were based primarily on public
policy arguments).
6 See id. at 36, 41-42, 46 (stating that while less than 1% of private sector arbitration
awards are appealed to federal court, in those cases that are appealed, parties have a 25%
chance of overturning the arbitration award at the district court level and a 30% chance of
overturning the arbitration award at the court of appeals level).
7 David E. Feller, Taft and Hartley Vindicated: The Curious History of Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards, 19 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 296, 302-06 (1998)
(suggesting that the grounds for public policy review of commercial arbitration cases are
quite narrow).

s zd.
9 Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 778-79 (1996) (demonstrating that
some courts are applying their view of the public policy standard from labor arbitration in
commercial cases, including employment cases); see also Kenneth R. Davis, When
Ignorance of the Law ls No Excuse, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49, 110 (1997) (noting that some
courts in commercial arbitration cases use the labor arbitration standard).
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in which labor arbitration ·awards have been contested on public policy
grounds. JO All the cases reviewed are discharge cases in which arbitration
awards reversing the terminations were challenged. 11 The article attempts to
determine the factors that influence courts to uphold or overturn arbitration
awards. This analysis will provide assistance to arbitrators in writing
opinions that are less subject to challenge, and to employers, unions, and
their attorneys in making arguments to arbitrators and courts, and in deciding
whether to challenge arbitration awards. Finality of arbitration awards is one
of the substantial virtues of the arbitral system. It is hoped that this analysis
will contribute to the finality of arbitration awards, and thereby, to industrial
peace. Furthermore, the analysis offers insights to parties and arbitrators in
employment law discharge arbitrations also, when similar issues are likely to
arise.

I. THE PuBuc POLICY EXCEPTION
In the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court established the basic
principles for judicial involvement in labor arbitration.12 The three cases
together articulated the national labor policy favoring settlement of labor
disputes through arbitration, ·and limiting judicial involvement in the arbitral
IO The arbitration awards analyzed are labor arbitration awards resulting from
collectively bargained arbitration provisions and do not include arbitration awards in
employment cases that arise from individual arbitration agreements in the nonunion
context. Similar issues arise, howe.ver, and the applicability of this analysis for
employment arbitration is discussed in Section VII. E.g., Painewebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49
F.3d 347, 350-52 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing labor arbitration case5 in analyzing the
employer's argument that an award of reinstatement under an individual arbitration
agreement should be overturned on public policy grounds).
11 Almost all of the cases involved reinstatement orders. One case involved back pay
only. Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, IBEW, 856 F.2d 1174, 1176 (8th Cir. 1988). Three
cases which did not involve actual discharges were deemed to meet the parameters of the
study because they involved public policy challenges to reinstatement. Gen. Refractories
Co. v. ABGW, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision), available at
No. 90-5588, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15652, at *2-*3 (involving arbitration award
requiring reinstatement after workers' compensation leave); World Airways, Inc. v. Int'l
Bhd. of Teamsters, Airline Div., 578 F.2d 800, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1978) (involving
arbitration award reversing demotion which effectively terminated employee as a pilot);
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union No. 251 v. Laber Russo Trucking Co., No. 920039P, 1992 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12~44. at *1-*2 (D.R.!. July 7, 1992) (involving
arbitration award reinstating employee after disability leave).
12 The Steelworkers Trilogy consists of the following cases! USW v. Am. Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960); USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582-83 (1960); and USW v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
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process. In Enterprise Wheel & Car Co., which dealt with judicial review of
arbitration awards, the Court held that arbitral awards should be enforced so
long as they draw their essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 13
The Court specified that in providing for arbitration of disputes about
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the parties bargained
for the decision of the arbitrator. 14 Therefore, the courts "have no business
overruling [the arbitrator] because their interpretation of the contract is
different from his."15
The public policy exception was first articulated by the Supreme Court in
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber
Workers. 16 There the Court held that "a court may not enforce a collectivebargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy .... [T]he question of
public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the courts." 17 The Court
specified, however, that the public policy must be "well defined and
dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal
precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public
interests. "' 18
The Court next addressed the public policy exception in Misco, a case
whose parameters fit neatly with those in this study.19 In Misco, the
employee was "apprehended by police in the· backseat of [a] car [in the
company parking lot] with marijuana smoke in the air and a lighted
marijuana cigarette in the frontseat ashtray."20 He was discharged for
violating a rule against possession of drugs on company property. 21 The
arbitrator reinstated the employee, finding insufficient evidence that he used
or possessed drugs on company property.22 Both the district court and the
court of appeals set aside the arbitration award, holding that the arbitration
award violated the public policy against operation of dangerous machinery
under the influence of drugs or alcohol.23 The Supreme Court reversed but,
as noted above, did not resolve the issue of whether a violation of positive
13 363 U.S. at597.
14 Id. at 599.
15 Id.
16 461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).

17 Id. (citation omitted).
l8 Id. (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945)).

19 United Paperworkers Int'! Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1987). The
opinions in Misco, while within the time period studied, were omitted from the analysis.
20 Id. at 33.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 34.
23 Id. at 34-35.
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law is required to set aside an arbitration award. Instead, the Court reiterated
its position in W.R. Grace that the arbitration award must create an "explicit
conflict with other 'laws and legal precedents"' to violate public policy. 24
The Court then concluded that the court of appeals did not .review laws and
legal precedents to find a public policy against operation , of dangerous
machinery under the influence of drugs. 25 The fact that common sense would
support that conclusion is not sufficient. 2~ Furthermore, even assuming such
a public policy existed, the Court found that the court of appeals improperly
inferred from the fact that marijuana had been found in the employee's car
that he would operate dangerous machinery under the influence of drugs.27
By making such an inference, the court usurped the role of the arbitrator, for
whose fact-finding the parties bargained.28
While the Misco Court did not resolve the question of the scope of the
public policy exception, it did establish a framework for courts reviewing
public policy claims. First, the court must ascertain whether there is a public
policy drawn from laws and legal precedents, not common sense. Second, the
court must determine whether there is an explicit conflict with that public
policy based on the facts found and the inferences drawn by the arbitrator.
The decision highlights some of the issues that may determine the outcome
of public policy claims. Others are revealed from review of the lower court
cases themselves.

II. THE CASES
A study of cases challenging arbitration awards between 1960 and 1988
found 73 cases in which the public policy argument was the primary claim.29
Of those cases, eleven involved union claims that the arbitration award
violated public policy.30 The instant study focused only .on federal, private
sector cases in which the employer claimed a public policy violation based
on an arbitrator's award reversing the discharge of an employee or group of
employees.31 Of the public policy cases identified in research, these
24 Id. at43.

25 Id. at44.
Id.
27 Id. at44-45.
2s Id. at45.
26

29 Feuille & LeRoy, supra note 5, at 44. The public policy cases constituted only 7%
of the cases found. Id.
30 Id. at43.
31 For a table of all cases considered in the study, see Appendix infra p. 154.
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constituted the overwhelming majority. The other public policy cases
contained no identifying patterns. Like the earlier study, this analysis began
with 1960, the date of the Steelworkers Trilogy. Fifty-four of the 138 cases
identified in this study were decided during the 1960-1988 time period
covered by the earlier study. Accordingly, in the last eleven years there were
eighty-four such cases,32 far more than in the twenty-eight year period
following the Supreme Court's decisions in the Steelworkers' Trilogy. 33 In
the last three years, there have been either ten or eleven cases per year,
suggesting a possible increase in the number of public policy challenges. 34
The instant research was conducted using the computerized LEXIS and
Westlaw databases and BNA's Labor Relations Reporter. Only cases decided
prior to December 31, 1999 were considered. Both court of appeals cases and
district court cases were included. Cases analyzed included only those cases
in which a public policy argument was discussed in the opinion of the court,
however briefly. In some cases this resulted in one opinion in a case being
considered while another was not.35 Of the 138 cases identified, sixty-three
were court of appeals cases and the remainder were district court cases.

32 This study analyzed cases decided through 1999. In the years since 1988, the
number of cases ranged from a high of eleven in 1990, 1997, and 1999 to a low of four in
1991. The cases were distributed as follows: five in 1989, eleven in 1990, four in 1991,
nine in 1992, six in 1993, five in 1994, six in 1995, six in 1996, eleven in 1997, ten in
1998, and eleven in 1999.
33 As noted supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text, the Steelworkers' Trilogy,
decided in 1960, limited judicial involvement in labor arbitration and encouraged unions,
employers, and courts to treat arbitral decisions as binding. Feuille & LeRoy, supra note
5, at36-37.
34 See supra note 32. A firm conclusion cannot be drawn about any increase,
however, since both district court and court of appeals opinions in the same case were
included, and any cases decided without published opinions were not.
35 E.g., First Nat'! Supermarkets, Inc. v. Retail & Chain Store Food Employees
Union Local 338, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2963, 2965-67 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (omitted
because no discussion of public policy argument), affd in part, vacated in part, First
Nat'! Supermarkets, Inc. v. Retail, Wholesale & Chain Store Food Employees Union
Local 338, 118 F.3d 892, 897-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (included based on public policy
argument).
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When the opinions of both the district court and court of appeals in a case
were published and discussed the public policy issue, both were included in
the analysis.36 The analysis included cases officially unpublished but
36 Both opinions were included even when the cotµt of appeals reversed the district
court (eleven cases, twenty-three opinions) based on the view that analyzing all judicial
opinions available would provide helpful information for arbitr(\tors and parties. There
were eleven cases in which both opinions were included and the court of appeals reversed
the district court's decision in relevant part. In one case, three opinions were included
because the district court decided the public policy issue on remand from the appellate
court. In the following cases, both opinions were analyzed: E. Associated Coal Co. v.
United Mine Workers Dist. 17, 66 F. Supp. 2d 79(5 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (upholding
arbitration award), aff'd per curiam, 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table
decision); Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. USW, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1044 (D. Utah 1998)
(upholding arbitration award), a!fd sub nom. Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker,
195 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 1999); Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union,
Local Union 676, No. 97-0753-R, 1998 U.S. Dist.'LEXIS 8109, at *14-*15 (W.D. Va.
Mar. 26, 1998) (overturning arbitration award), rev'd, 171 F.3d 971 (4th Cir. 1999);
Local 97, IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 96-CV-728, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20578 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1997) (overturning arbitration award), rev'd, 196 F.3d
117 (2d Cir.1999); Exxon Corp. v. Esso Worker's Union, Inc., 942F. Supp. 703, 711 (D.
Mass. 1996) (upholding arbitration award), rev'd, 118 F.3d 841 (1st Cir. 1997); Local 97,
IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 950 F. Supp. 1227, 1236-37 (N.D.N.Y. 1996)
(overturning arbitration award), rev'd, 143 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998); UFCW, Local 588 v.
Foster Food Products, No. CV-F-93-5557, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21227 (E.D. Cal.
May 23, 1994) (upholding arbitration award), affd sub nom. UFCW, Local 588 v. Foster
Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169, 174-75 (9th Cir. 1995); Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp.
Union, 820 F. Supp. 1198, 1203-05 (D. Neb. 1993) (holding that no public policy
exception for enforcement exists under Railway Labor Act), rev'd an_d remanded, Union
Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 23 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994) (remanding to
district court to apply public policy exception), on remand, Union Pac. R.R. v. United
Transp. Union, 860 F. Supp. 676 (D. Neb. 1994) (finding no violation of public policy);
Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 801 F. Supp. 1379, 1392 (D.N.J. 1992)
(overturning arbitration award), aff'd, 11 F.3d 1189, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993); Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 788 F. Supp. 829, 846 (D.N.J. 1992)
(overturning arbitration award), aff'd, 993 F.2d 357, 368 (3d Cir. 1993); Union Pac. R.R.
v. United Transp. Union, 794 F. Supp. 891, 895 (D. Neb. 1992) (vacating arbitration
award and remanding for another hearing), ajfd in part, rev'd in part, 3 F.3d 255, 264
(8th Cir. 1993) (affirming order vacating arbitration award but reversing remand to
arbitration board); Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. AFSCME, Local 1733, 756 F.
Supp. 349, 352-53 (W.D. Tenn. 1991) (overturning arbitration award), rev'd, 967 F.2d
1091, 1098 (6th Cir. 1992); Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 762 F. Supp. 1187, 1190 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (overturning arbitration award),
ajfd, 969 F.2d 1436, 1438, 1454 (3d Cir. 1992); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union of
Allied Indus. Workers, 748 F. Supp. 1352, 1365 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (upholding arbitration
award), aff'd, 959 F.2d 685, 690 (7th Cir. 1992); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l, 686 F. Supp. 1573, 1580-81 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (overturning arbitration
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reported in the unofficial reporters, but no analysis was done of district court
cases reported only in the opinion of the court of appeals because of the
inability to review the entire opinion. The analysis also included cases in
which a public policy argument was made, but the case was decided on other
grounds.37
One interesting phenomenon is the number of cases involving challenges
to arbitral awards by two employers. Of the 138 cases identified, ten, all in
the 1990s, involved Exxon38 and eleven, all in the 1980s, involved the United
award), aff'd, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988); United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'! Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 663 F. Supp. 118, 120 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (overturning arbitration award),
rev'd, 839 F.2d 146, 150-51 (3d Cir. 1988); United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers, 631 F. Supp. 599, 602 (D.D.C. 1986) (overturning arbitration award),
rev'd, 810 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli
Employees Indep. Ass'n, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3312, 3316 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (overturning
arbitration award), rev'd, 790 F.2d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 1986); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 633 F. Supp. 779, 796-97 (D.D.C. 1985) (overturning
arbitration award), rev'd, 808 F.2d 76, 84 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Premium Bldg. Prods. Co. v.
USW, Local Union No. 8869, 616 F. Supp. 512, 516 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (upholding
arbitration award), aff'd, 798 F.2d 1415 (6th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision),
available at No. 85-3749, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27197, at *16; Am. Postal Workers
Union v. United States Postal Serv., No. C-80-0748-WWS, 1980 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13350 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1980) (overturning arbitration award), aff'd, 682 F.2d 1280,
1286 (9th Cir. 1982); Local 453, IUE v. Otis Elevator Co., 206 F. Supp. 853, 855
(S.D.N.Y. 1962) (overturning arbitration award), rev'd, 314 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1963).
37 There are six such cases in the study.
38 All the cases were in the 1990s, after the Exxon Valdez disaster. For a brief
explanation of the Exxon Valdez disaster, see infra note 41. Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding reinstatement of
chief pumpman for refusing drug test did not violate public policy when the arbitrator
found no cause to test); Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77
F.3d 850, 856-57 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding that arbitration award reinstating employee in
safety-sensitive position who tested positive for cocaine violated public policy); Gulf
Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244, 257 (5th Cir. 1993)
(finding that arbitration award reinstating refinery process technician who tested positive
for cocaine violated public policy); Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 980 F. Supp. 752, 769 (D.N.J. 1997) (overturning arbitration award
reinstating chemical operator-blender who tested positive for drug use, even though job
not safety-sensitive); Exxon Corp. v. Esso Worker's Union, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 703, 71011 (D. Mass. 1996) (upholding arbitration award reinstating tanker truck driver who
tested positive for cocaine use when there was no finding of impairment), rev'd sub nom.
Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 852 (1st Cir. 1997); Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 801 F. Supp. 1379, 1391-92 (D.N.J. 1992)
(overturning arbitration award reinstating a seaman discharged for having blood alcohol
three to four times the limit allowed under Exxon and Coast Guard policy), aff'd, 11 F.3d
1189, 1195-96 (3d Cir. 1993); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 788 F.
Supp. 829, 846 (D.N.J. 1992) (overturning arbitration award reinstating seaman on oil
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States Postal Service.39 The reason for the substantial number of challenges
by these employers is not clear.40 They may have been more willing to
challenge arbitrators' awards, or they may have had more arbitration awards
lending themselves to a public policy challenge. Exxon .was particularly
successful at overturning arbitration awards on public policy grounds,
perhaps because the cases often involved wor~ers on oil tankers accused of
alcohol or drug offenses, evoking fears of a repeat of the Exxon Valdez
disaster.41
,
tanker who tested positive for drugs), aff'd, 993 F.2d 357, 368 (3d Cir. 1993).
39 United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775, 777-78
(11th Cir. 1988) (denying enforcement of arbitration award reinstating employee who
engaged in mail theft on other grounds, declining to rule on the public policy question
because of the uncertainty of the law); Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal
Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding reinstatement of p~.stal employee fired
for dishonesty did not violate public policy); Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States
Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280, 1286 (9th Cir. 1982) (denying enforcement because
reinstatement of postal employee who participated in strike violates law); United States
Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 631 F. Supp. 599, 601-02 (D.D.C. 1986)
(vacating arbitration award reinstating mail carrier convicted of unlawful delay of mail as
violative of public policy), rev'd, 810 F.2d 1239, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987); United States
Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, No. C-80-0748-WWS, 1980 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13350 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 1980) (denying enforcement of arbitration award
reinstating postal employee who engaged in an illegal strike as violative of public policy),
aff'd, 736 F.2d 822, 826 (1st Cir. 1984); Nat'l Rural Letter Carriers' Ass'n v. United
States Postal Serv., 637 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (D.D.C. 1986) (upholding arbitration award
reinstating employee who committed mail theft since it did not violate the law or require
an unlawful act); Nat'l Rural Letter Carriers' Ass'n v. United States Postal Serv., 625 F.
Supp. 1527, 1528, 1530-31 (D.D.C. 1986) (refusing to overturn arbitration award
reinstating employee indicted for criminal sexual abuse of his adopted daughter, charges
which were later dropped when the employee entered a voluntary deferred prosecution
program and paid a fine);United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 663
F. Supp. 118, 120 (W.D. Pa. 1987) (overturning arbitration award reinstating employee
terminated for shooting into his supervisor's unoccupied car), rev'd, 839 F.2d 146, 149, .
150-51 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding district court exceeded its reviewing authority by
overturning arbitrator's award since the arbitrator determined that the grievant had no
further proclivity for aggression).
40 Six opinions, all drug cases, involved Union Pacific· Railroad. United Transp.
Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 116 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1997); Union Pac. R.R. v. United
Transp. Union, 820 F. Supp. 1198, 1203-04 (D. Neb. 1993), rev'd and remanded, 23
F.~d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994), on remand, 860 F. Supp. 676 (D. Neb. 1994); Union
Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 794 F. Supp. 891 (D. Neb. 1992), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 3 F.3d 255, 264 (8th Cir. 1993).
41 See Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 849 (1st Cir. 1997)
(specifically citing the incident in support of the decision). The Exxon Valdez accident
occurred on March 24, 1989. Barbara Wickens & Bob Ortega; Wake of the Valdez: The
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There are common causes for discharge in the cases reviewed.42 By far
the largest number of cases, forty-eight, involved use or possession of drugs,
or involved failed or refused drug tests. Fourteen cases each involved alcohol
use or abuse, and violence or threats of violence. 43 Thirteen cases each dealt
with employees fired for sexual harassment or violations relating to patient
safety. Ten cases involved vehicle safety issues not relating to alcohol or
drug use,44 and nine raised safety issues at nuclear facilities. In four cases, all
involving the Postal Service, the employee was terminated for theft. Viewed
broadly, these reasons for employee discharge might be described as
involving conduct morally opprobrious, if not unlawful.
The cases were analyzed for identifying patterns that would predict
success or failure in a challenge based on public policy. The following
characteristics were identified: the scope of the standard of review; the public
policy at issue, including implications for public safety; whether the
employee's misconduct was integral to employment; the arbitrator's findings
of fact; and the arbitrator's reason for overturning the termination.

III. THE SCOPE OF TIIE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Two different views of the public policy standard for review have
evolved in the courts. Under one interpretation, an arbitration award can be
vacated on public policy grounds only if the arbitration award itself violates
positive law or requires the employer to violate positive law.45 This standard

Wrecked Tanker Inflicts New Damage, MACLEAN'S, Apr. 17, 1989, at 49. The oil tanker
Exxon Valdez hit a reef outside the shipping lane in which it was supposed to travel,
tearing holes in the hull that allowed over 10 million gallons of oil to be released into the
Prince William Sound. George J. Church, The Big Spill: Bred from Complacency, the
Valdez Fiasco Goes from Bad to Worse to Worst Possible, TIME, Apr. 10, 1989, at 38, 40.
At the time of the accident, the captain had returned to his cabin and left the operation of
the tanker with the third mate, who was not certified to pilot in the sound. Id. at 40. When
tested nine hours after the accident, the captain was found to have a blood alcohol level in
excess of that permitted by Coast Guard regulations. Id. The oil spill covered almost 900
square miles within a week, creating major environmental problems. Id. at 38.
42 Except as noted otherwise, when a discharge fell into two categories, it was
counted in both.
43 This included cases in which the employee was accused of having a weapon at
work.
44 Two of these cases involved an employer asserting that the employee did not meet
federal safety regulations for driving commercial vehicles because of a disabling
condition.
45 E.g., Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
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has been denominated the narrow or limitist exception.46 The alternative
view, the broad public policy exception, does not require a demonstration
that the arbitration award either violates positive law or requires the
employer to violate positive law, but rather looks for a conflict with public
policy more broadly defined.47 Although in Misco, the Supreme Court failed
to resolve the question of which standard to apply,48 the Court has a second
chance in Eastern Associated Coal. Both before and. after Misco, scholars
and courts have debated the issue of the appropriate standard.49 While full
discussion of the debate is beyond the scope of this article, a brief outline
will aid in understanding the decisions of the courts.
The public policy exception derives from the basic notion that no court
will lend its aid to one who founds a cause of action upon an immoral or
illegal act, and is further justified by the observation that the public's interest
in confining the scope of private agreements to which it is not a party will go
unrepresented unless the judiciary takes account of those interests when it
considers whether to enforce such agreements.so
Proponents of a broad public policy exception argue that it is the role of
the courts to enforce public policy; should the court abandon this role, the
46 Bernard D. Meltzer, After the lAbor Arbitration Award: The Public Policy
Defense, 10 INDUS. REL. L.J. 241, 244 (1988).
47 E.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 674 (11th
Cir.1988).
48 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 45 n.12 (1987).
49 E.g., Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Law of Arbitration, in LABOR ARBITRATION
UNDER FIRE 1, 39-40 (James L. Stern & Joyce M. Najita eds., 1997) (arguing for a
narrow standard); Frank H. Easterbrook, Arbitration, Contract, an{APublic Policy, in
ARBITRATION 1991: THE CHANGING FACE OF ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE,
65, 70-71 (Gladys W. Gruenberg ed., 1992) (arguing for a narrow standard); Richard
Gear, A Management Viewpoint, in ARBITRATION 1991: THE CHANGING FACE OF
ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 77, 88 (arguing for a broader standard
using common sense); David M. Silberman; A Union Viewpoint, in ARBITRATION 1991:
THE CHANGING FACE OF ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra, at 89, 91
(arguing for a narrow standard); Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
Awards: The Clash Between the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 4 (1988) (arguing for narrow standard); Meltzer, supra note 46, at
255-56 (arguing for a broad standard); Deanna J. Mouser, Analysis of the Public Policy
Exception After Paperworkers v. Misco: A Proposal to Limit the Public Policy Exception
and to Allow the Parties to Submit the Public Policy Question to the Arbitrator, 12
INDUS. REL. L.J. 89, 146 (1990) (arguing for narrow standard); Bret F. Randall,
Comment, The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created Standards of
Review for Arbitration Awards, 1992 BYU L. REV. 759, 781-83 (arguing for a broad
standard).
50 Misco, 484 U.S. at 42.
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public's interest will be unrepresented.51 The result often will be a risk to
public health and safety.52
Opponents of the broad view cite the risk to the finality of arbitration
awards, which jeopardizes stable labor relations.53 Invalidating arbitration
awards that do not violate the law interferes with the national labor policy
favoring resolution of labor disputes through free collective bargaining.54 In
addition, the broader public policy exception permits courts to substitute their
judgment for that of the arbitrator, refusing to enforce decisions with which
they disagree.55 Finally, supporters of the narrow exception argue that the
court, like the arbitrator, is required to enforce contracts unless they are
unlawful.56 Elsewhere, I have taken the position that the narrow view is the
standard which best effectuates labor policy in both the private and public
sectors.57 Regardless of which is the appropriate standard, however, it is
clear that the choice of standard often determines the outcome of the case.

5l Id.; Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, IBEW, 856 F.2d 1174, 1181 (8th Cir. 1988);
Gear, supra note 49, at 88.
52 Misco, 484 U.S. at 42. Professor Meltzer suggests an additional drawback to a
narrow public policy exception. A narrow approach might prevent courts from
overturning arbitration awards upholding discharges that violate public policy. Meltzer,
supra note 46, at 254-55. Since that article was written, the Supreme Court decided
Lingle v. Norge, 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1988), in which it held that a state wrongful
discharge claim was not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994). Indeed, Professor Meltzer suggested in the article that a limitist
interpretation of the public policy exception might contribute to such a decision. Meltzer,
supra note 46, at 254-55. And as he correctly pointed out, allowing such state court
wrongful discharge claims despite prior arbitration of the discharge does not promote the
finality of arbitration awards. Id.
53 Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local Union 676, 171 F.3d
971, 977-78 (4th Cir. 1999); Edwards, supra note 49, at 34; Christopher T. Hexter,
Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: How the Public Policy Exception Cases
Ignore the Public Policies Underlying Labor Arbitration, 34 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 77, 10305 (1989). The achievement of stable labor relations is an important goal of national
labor policy. A policy that establishes a broad ground for reversal threatens the stability
of labor relations by encouraging more litigation: a costly effect to the parties involved as
well as to the court system. Edwards, supra note 49, at 34.
54 Edwards, supra note 49, at 23-29.
55 Id. at 23, 34; Gear, supra note 49, at 88. But see Meltzer, supra note 46, at 251
(stating that if the public policy defense were unavailable in just cause cases, employers
challenging reinstatement would likely argue that the arbitration award did not draw its
essence from the agreement and a court could easily set aside the arbitration award on
those grounds).
56 Easterbrook, supra note 49, at 77.
57 Ann C. Hodges, The Steelworkers Trilogy in the Public Sector, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 631, 682-83 (1990).
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A second aspect of the scope of the standard of review also divides the
courts. Some courts require a showing that the arbitration award conflicts
with public policy, while others look to whether the conduct leading to
termination conflicts with public policy. Thus, if the employee engaged in
unlawful conduct which caused the termination, under the latter standard the
court could conclude that the arbitration award violated public policy
because it reinstated an employee who violated positive law. Under the
former, a court could find no public policy violation unless the law explicitly
prohibited employment of an individual with a record of past illegal conduct.
Two similar cases with contrasting results illustrate the difference.
In both Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International58 and
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International,59 arbitrators
reinstated airline pilots terminated for flying so close in time to drinking
alcohol that their blood alcohol levels violated company rules and Federal
Aviation Administration regulations. The D.C. Circuit in Northwest Airlines
upheld the reinstatement, finding no public policy violation,60 while the
Eleventh Circuit in Delta Air Lines overturned the arbitration award on
public policy grounds.61 The D.C. Circuit applied the exception narrowly,
and looked to whether the arbitration award itself violated the law.62 Since
there was no law prohibiting reformed alcoholics from flying as pilots, the
court allowed the arbitration award to stand.63 In contrast to the D.C. Circuit,
the Eleventh Circuit stated the issue as whether "'an established public policy
condemn[s] the performance of employment activities in the· manner engaged
in by the employee?"'64 The court concluded that there was an established
public policy which prohibited flying while intoxicated and that the
arbitrator's finding of no just cause for termination conflicted with that
policy.65 Thus, one court looked at the arbitration award and specifically at
the legality of reinstatement, while the other looked at the legality of the
underlying conduct.
These two cases are typical of the public policy discharge cases. An
employee is terminated for conduct that is either unlawful or violates a rule
designed to protect against a risk to the public or other employees. The
58 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
59 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988).
60 808 F.2d at 83-84.
61 861 F.2d at 668, 672-74.
62 Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 80.
63 Id. at 83-84.
64 Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 671.
65 [d.
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arbitrator reinstates the employee and the employer either refuses to comply
with the arbitration award, forcing the union to seek judicial enforcement, or
seeks to have the arbitration award vacated by a court on public policy
grounds. The scope of the court's application of the standard has a substantial
determinative effect on the outcome of the case.
The D.C. Circuit clearly has adopted the narrowest view, holding that an
arbitration award must violate positive law to be set aside. The court requires
that the law clearly bar reinstatement; it is insufficient that the employee
violated the law prior to termination. This narrow standard resulted in
rejection of public policy challenges in each of the four D.C. circuit court
cases in the study, as the court found in each case that the arbitration award
did not violate the law or require the employer to do so.66 The Ninth Circuit
also appears to have adopted the limitist view. In UFCW, Local 588 v. Foster
Poultry Farms, 61 the court most clearly stated the narrow interpretation of
the exception, saying "[b]ecause the DOT regulations do not make it illegal
to reinstate employees who test positive for drug use, it cannot be said that
the DOT regulations 'specifically militate[] against the relief ordered by the
66 United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239, 124142 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no public policy against reinstatement of an employee who
was convicted of unlawful delay of the mail); Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilots
Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding no public policy against reinstatement
of an airline pilot who flew with a blood alcohol level above the limit set by the Federal
Aviation Administration regulations); Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal
Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("There is surely no doubt that the instant case does
not pose a situation requiring the invocation of a public policy exception. The arbitrator's
award was not itself unlawful, for there is no legal proscription against the reinstatement
of a person such as the grievant. And the arbitration award did not otherwise have the
effect of mandating any illegal conduct."). Out of the six District of Columbia district
court cases identified, the court upheld the arbitrator's award in four of the cases,
applying the narrow test both before and after it was adopted by the Court of Appeals.
CWA v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 1998)
(upholding reinstatement of employee discharged for sexual harassment when arbitrator
found no sexual harassment); Nat'l Rural Letter Carriers' Ass'n v. United States Postal
Serv., 637 F. Supp. 1041, 1043 (D.D.C. 1986) (relying on Am. Postal Workers Union,
789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986)); Nat'l Rural Letter Carriers' Ass'n v. United States Postal
Serv., 625 F. Supp. 1527 (D.D.C. 1986) (refusing to overturn arbitration award
reinstating employee indicted for criminal sexual abuse of his adopted daughter, charges
which were later dropped when the employee entered a voluntary deferred prosecution
program and paid a fine); SEID, Local 722 v. Children's Hosp. Nat'l Med. Ctr., 640 F.
Supp. 272, 275 (D.D.C. 1984) (applying narrow standard and upholding arbitration
award). The exceptions were the district court's decisions in National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers and Northwest Airlines, which were later overturned by the court of appeals.
631 F. Supp. 599 (D.D.C. 1986), rev'd, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987); 633 F. Supp.
779 (D.D.C. 1985), rev'd, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
67 74 F.3d 169 (9th Cir. 1995).
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arbitrator' in this case."68 Even prior to its adoption of the limitist view, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted the standard narrowly; in the nine Ninth Circuit
cases identified, the court upheld the arbitrator's decision in six, overturned
the decision in two, and remanded one.q9
68 Id. at 174 (citing Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d
1200, 1212-13 (9th Cir. 1989)). Foster, decided in' 1995, is the most recent Ninth Circuit
pronouncement, other than the remand in Union Pacific Railroad, see infra note 69, and
seems to place the Ninth Circuit in the limitist camp; Characterization of circuits based on
the scope of the standard is debatable in some cases, however, and depends on the
interpretation of the language of the court. In addition, the court may use different
language in different cases, thus appearing to apply a narrower standard in some cases
than others, perhaps driven by the concern for public safety. For a different classification,
see Scott Barbakoff, Note, Application of the Public Policy Exception for the
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards: There ls No Place Like "The Home" in Saint Mary
Home, Inc. v. Service Employees International Union, District 1199, 43 VILL. L. REV.
829, 849-52 (1998).
69 Of the two cases overturning the arbitrator's award, one was a 1978 case in which
the court made no specific reference to the public policy exception. World Airways, Inc.
v. Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978). The court relied on federal law
and the policy ensuring air travel safety to uphold the district court decision, which struck
down the arbitration award requiring the· employer to retrain a pilot demoted for
judgment errors and to give him an opportunity to requalify. Id. at 803. Although World
Airways technically involved a demotion, the employee was effectively terminated as a
pilot so the case was deemed to meet the parameters of the study. In the second case, the
court applied the narrow exception, finding that reinstatement of a postal employee who
participated in a strike would violate the federal law barring strikers from federal
employment. Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 682 F.2d 1280,
1286 (9th Cir. 1982). In another case, the court remanded to the arbitration board for a
factual determination as to whether the employee used drugs. United Transp. Union v.
Union Pac. R.R., 116 F.3d 430, 435 (9th Cir. 1997). The court concluded that the district
court erred in overturning the arbitration award on public policy grounds because the
arbitration board made no finding that the employee used drugs. Id. at 434. Thus,
although the statute expressly barred reinstatement of an employee who violated drug
prohibitions unless the employee completed a rehabilitation program, it was not clear that
the arbitration award violated public policy. Id. Accordingly, the appropriate course of
action was a remand to the arbitration board. In the other seven· cases, the court applied
the narrow public policy exception to uphold arbitration awards. Ass'n of Flight
Attendants v. Aloha Airlines, 113 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table opinion),
available at No. 96-15088, 96-16662, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 11436 (stating that issue is
whether reinstatement violates public policy, not underlying conduct); Foster Poultry
Farms, 74 F.3d at 174 (stating that DOT regulations prohibit employees who test positive
for drug use from operating commercial motor vehicles but do not require their discharge
or prohibit their reinstatement); Am. Poultry Co. v. Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters Local Union
No. 85, 895 F.2d 1416 (9th Cir. 1990) (unpublished table opinion) available at No. 882977, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 2053 (assuming that a well-defined and dominant public
policy exists, employer has not shown that arbitration award, rather than interpretation of
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As noted above, courts that have not adopted the narrowest view of the
exception may still limit the ability to overturn arbitration awards by looking
for very explicit policies that would directly conflict with arbitral awards.
Although this approach might be classified as an intermediate approach, the
narrow and intermediate approaches may merge when the court is looking for
an explicit legal prohibition on reemployment of an employee who has
engaged in particular conduct. They may diverge, however, when the facts
indicate some possibility that the unlawful conduct may be repeated, but
when no legal prohibition on reinstatement exists. In such a case, a court
taking the limitist view would not set aside the arbitration award, while a
court taking the intermediate approach might do so. The Second Circuit has
taken the intermediate approach, upholding five of seven arbitration awards
in the study and remanding one. In the five cases affirming arbitration
awards, the court read the public policy narrowly. For example, in Local 453,
JUE v. Otis Elevator Co.,10 the court found the public policy against
gambling was vindicated by a criminal conviction and suspension and did not
require sustaining the employee's termination. 71 Similarly, the public policy
favoring nuclear safety did not bar reinstatement of an employee in a safetysensitive position discharged after adulterating a drug test and then testing
positive, when reinstatement was conditioned on rehabilitation and follow-up
testing and Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations contemplated
rehabilitation.72
the collective bargaining agreement, violates the policy); Stead Motors v. Auto.
Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1217 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that there can
be no showing that reinstatement violates public policy unless a court assumes that
employee will engage in unlawful conduct in the future, however, it is not free to assume
this); Bevies Co. v. Teamsters Local 986, 791 F.2d 1391, 1392-93 (9th Cir. 1986)
(stating that reinstatement of undocumented workers does not violate public policy or
law, since state law is unclear and there is no direct conflict with federal law, because
reinstatement would not encourage illegal reentry into the country); Amalgamated Transit
Union Local Div. 1307 v. Aztec Bus Lines, 654 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding
that it is not unlawful to employ bus drivers who have previously shown bad judgment).
70 314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1963).
11 Id. at 29.
72 IBEW, Local 97 v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 143 F.3d 704, 718 (2d Cir.
1998); see also Local 97, IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 196 F.3d 117, 130-31
(2d Cir. 1999) (upholding arbitration award reinstating nuclear security officer who was
grossly negligent and lied about failure to respond to alarm, when court could not
conclude with certainty that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would find such
conduct precluded reinstatement); Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. SEIU, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d
41, 45 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that public policy against possession, sale, and use of
drugs does not prohibit reinstatement of health care employee arrested for drug offense
on the job); First Nat'!, Inc. v. Retail Wholesale & Chain Store Food Employees Union,
Local 338, 118 F.3d 892, 897-98 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding public policy does not prohibit
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The Sixth Circuit has taken an approach similar to the Second, requiring
an explicit conflict between the arbitration award, not the underlying
behavior, and a well-defined public policy found in law. This interpretation
of the exception caused the court to affirm arbitration awards in all of the
nine Sixth Circuit cases identified in the study.73 And although Judge
reinstatement of food store employee who reported to work under influence of alcohol
and drugs and displayed gun to coworker). But see Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island
Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that
reinstatement of sexual harasser violates public policy requiring employer to eliminate
sexual harassment in the workplace although neither EEOC Guidelines nor court
decisions require termination of harassers). Finally, in Perma-Line Corp. of Am. v. Sign
Pictorial & Display Union, Local 230, 639 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1981), the court remanded
to allow the union to submit evidence supporting its argument that contractual prohibition
on discharge of union stewards without union consent did not violate § 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, since the prohibition was the basis on which the arbitrator
set aside the termination. l<f.. at 895-96.
73 MidMichigan Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Prof'! Employees Div. of Local 79, 183 F.3d
497, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no public policy precluding the reinstatement of a
nurse "who has committed isolated acts of negligence."); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn.
Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 519-21 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding no
violation of public policy when arbitrator ordered reinstatement of nuclear reactor
employee who failed drug test because regulations did not clearly preclude it and the
employer could still conduct a fair hearing on whether the employee was fit for duty after
reinstatement); Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 957, 181 F.3d
100 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table decision), available at No. 98-3682, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 9144 (holding that arbitrator's opinion reinstating employee discharged for
absenteeism does not violate public policy established by the Americans with Disabilities
Act, by contrasting absenteeism of grievant with that of employye with long term illness
and suggesting the latter might be permissible); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. UAW, 981
F.2d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Interstate Brands v. Teamsters Local Union No.
135, 909 F.2d 885, 892-94 (6th Cir. 1990), and noting that the arbitration award, rather
than the employee conduct, must violate public policy, the court found that no public
policy precludes reinstatement of an employee who tested positive for drugs with no
evidence of impairment or drug use on duty); Shelby County Health Care Corp. v.
AFSCME, Local 1733, 967 F.2d 1091, 1096 (6th Cir. 1992) (noting that statute providing
that employee striking health care facility without proper notice loses status as employee
specifically implies that employee could be reemployed); Gen. Refractories Co. v.
ABGW, 931 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table opinion), available at No. 905588, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 15652, at *2-*3 (holding that arbitration award requiring
reinstatement of employee after workers' compensation leave does not violate public
policy although arbitrator based reinstatement on conclusion that employee did not have
silicosis despite earlier finding by the Workers' Compensation Board that the employee
had silicosis, when arbitrator's decision assessed current condition based on new
evidence); Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 894
(6th Cir. 1990) (upholding reinstatement of truck driver charged with off-duty drug
possession, and noting that even state laws don't prohibit driving by persons convicted of
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Easterbrook has persuasively argued that the narrowest interpretation is the
correct one,74 the Seventh Circuit as a whole has taken the intermediate
approach of the Second and Sixth Circuits, upholding three arbitration
awards.75
Recently, the Fourth Circuit weighed in on the public policy debate with
two 1999 decisions. In the first, Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers
International Union, Local Union 676,76 the court came down on the side of
a narrow reading but stopped short of requiring a violation of positive law.77
In Westvaco Corp., the court concluded that the public policy against sexual
harassment did not bar reinstatement of a harasser after a nine-month
suspension.78 The court stated: "[a]nything but a narrow implementation
of ... [the public policy] doctrine provides courts too much latitude. Public
policy can easily become a vessel into which judges pour their own
subjective preferences in derogation of the arbitral process and the
contractual commitments of the parties which it represents."79 The court also
noted, however, that the conduct at issue (sexual harassment) neither
compromised the performance of a safety sensitive job nor constituted
criminal misconduct, suggesting that a different result might obtain in such
impaired driving unless their license is revoked); Joseph & Feiss Co. v. ACTWU, 861
F.2d 720 (6th Cir. 1988) (unpublished table opinion), available at No. 87-3832, 1988
U.S. App. LEXIS 14898, at *9-*10 (finding arbitration award does not violate public
policy even if conduct leading to termination does); Premium Bldg. Prods. Co. v. USW,
Local Union No. 8869, 798 F.2d 1415 (6th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table opinion),
available at No. 85-3749, 1986 U.S. App. LEXIS 27197, at *l-*15 (holding that
illegality of conduct not sufficient for public policy violation).
74 Easterbrook, supra note 49; E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli
Employees Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 617-21 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.,
concurring).
75 DuPont, 790 F.2d at 617. In DuPont, the court upheld the arbitration award,
deferring to the arbitrator's factual finding that a recurrence of the employee's violent
conduct was unlikely and concluding that, accordingly, the arbitration award did not
violate any public policy relating to workplace safety, see also Chrysler Motors Corp. v.
Int'l Union of Allied Indus. Workers, 959 F.2d 685, 688 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding
arbitration award when arbitrator found that sexual harasser was subject to
rehabilitation); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, Dist No. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406 F.2d
1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1969) (finding public policy against gambling does not require
discharge).
76 Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'I Union, Local Union 676, 171 F.3d
971 (4th Cir. 1999).
77 Id. See infra notes 81-84 and accompanying text, however, noting that the
Eastern Associated Coal decision may indicate that the Fourth Circuit has joined the
Ninth and D.C. Circuits in adopting the narrowest interpretation of the exception.
78 Westvaco Corp., 171 F.3d at 972.
79 Id. at 978.
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cases.80
Subsequently, in a per curiam opinion in Eastern Associated Coal, the
Court affirmed the decision of the West Virginia District Court, rejecting a
public policy challenge to an arbitration award that reinstated an employee in
a safety sensitive job who tested positive for drugs.Bl The court described the
district court's decision as follows:
The court also ruled that the arbitrator's award was not contrary to a welldefined and dominant public policy because although there is a public
policy against the use of illegal drugs by those in safety-sensitive positions,
there is no such public policy against the reinstatement 9f employees who
have used illega~ drugs in the past. 82

This description of the district court's opinion does not clearly require
that the decision violate positive law. However, the court expressly adopted
the district court's rationale and there is language in the district court opinion
that can be read as requiring that the arbitration award violate positive law or
require the employer to do so in order to be set aside. The district court,
citing the Ninth Circuit's decision in Foster Poultry Farms, stated: "Because
the DOT Regulations do not make it illegal to reinstate employees who test
positive for drug use, it cannot be said that the DOT Regulations 'specifically
militate against the relief ordered by the arbitrator' in this case. "83
The Tenth Circuit issued two Q.ecisions that met the parameters of the
study. In the first, it upheld the arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee who
engaged in sexual harassment, but the scope of its standard is not clear from
the decision, which was based on deference to the arbitrator's findings.84 In
the second, the court took the intermediate approach, refusing to invalidate
an arbitration award reinstating an employee who tested positive for drugs
80 Id. at 977 & n.2.
8l E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mining Workers, Dist. 17, 188 F.3d 501 (4th
Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision), available at No. 98-2527, 1999
U.S. App. LEXIS 19944, at *4-*5.
82 Id. at *4.
83 E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mining Workers, Dist. 17, 66 F. Supp. 796,
805 (S.D. W. Va. 1998) (citing UFCW, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 74 F.3d 169,
174 (9th Cir. 1995)). The employer's petition for certioratj, which was granted,
characterizes the Fourth Circuit as requiring that the arbitration award violate positive
law or mandate unlawful conduct by the employer to meet the public policy exception.
See Victoria Roberts, Arbitration: Justices to Review Arbitrator's Reinstatement of
Equipment Operator Who Failed Drug Test, 55 DAILY LAB. REP, Mar. 21, 2000, at AA1.
84 CWA v. Southeastern Elec. Coop., 882 F.2d 467, 469 (10th Cir. 1989).
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because the Utah statutory provisions relating to drugs did not "suggest that
every employee in a safety sensitive position that tests positive one time,
with no other evidence of drug involvement, must be fired."8 5
The broadest formulation of the public policy exception has been
adopted in the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. The Fifth
Circuit overturned four arbitration awards, more than any other circuit, while
upholding one and remanding one. 86 In the earliest case to address the issue,
the court found a public policy violation based on the conduct for which the
employee was discharged. 87 Citing federal motor carrier regulations against
drinking and driving, the court concluded that there was a "public policy
against allowing a professional driver to continue his driving duties after
having been caught drinking on the job ...."88 The court neither required a
violation of positive law nor evaluated the arbitration award, rather than the
underlying conduct, for public policy implications. Later, in a post-Misco
case, the court indicated that the focus should be on whether the arbitration
award violates public policy, but adhered to the view that a violation of
positive law is not required, finding that reinstatement of an employee who
tested positive for drugs to a safety-sensitive position was inconsistent with
various regulations designed to eliminate workplace drug use. 89 Three years
later, however, the court took a step back toward the broadest reading,
holding that even back pay without reinstatement of an employee who had
tested positive for drugs while working in a safety sensitive position violated

85 Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999)
("We are not persuaded that these provisions [of Utah drug law] constitute a clear public
policy that prohibits reinstatement of an employee in the grievant's circumstances ....").
The court indicated that the deference due to arbitration awards supported its decision to
proceed cautiously when asked to set aside an arbitration award on public policy grounds.
Id. at 1207-08.
86 See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
87 Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d
122, 125 (5th Cir. 1983).
8 8 Id. at 125. The court also stated that "[i]n a nation where motorists practically live
on the highways, no citation of authority is required to establish that an arbitration award
ordering a company to reinstate an over-the-road truck driver caught drinking liquor on
duty violates public policy." Id. at 124. In a 1987 case, the court relied on its opinion in
United Paperworkers Int'/ Union v. Misco, Inc., 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 484
U.S. 29 (1987), to find that it was appropriate t~ remand the case to the arbitrator to
determine whether post-arbitration award drug use precluded enforcement of an arbitral
reinstatement award as against public policy. OCAW, Local No. 4-228 v. Union Oil Co.,
818 F.2d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 1987).
89 Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244, 250-51
(5th Cir. 1993).
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public policy because it condoned rnisconduct.90
Despite adopting a broad standard, the Third Circuit upheld five
arbitration awards and overturned three.91 However, three of the cases in
which the arbitration award was upheld preceded the circuit's rejection of the
narrow public policy standard.92 In another, the court found no laws or legal
precedents setting forth a public policy that would be violated by
reinstatement and retraining of a bus driver who had twenty-four accidents in
twelve years.93 The fifth case that survived the scrutiny of the Third Circuit
involved judicial deference to the arbitrator's factual findings.9 4 The Third
Circuit articulated its broad test in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's
Union,95 stating that the court should look to the underlying purpose of .a law
in determining whether public policy is violated.96 Thus, the Third Circuit is
90 Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850, 856 (5th
Cir. 1996); see also Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial
Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599, 604 (5th Cir. 1989) (failing to reach public policy argument yet
setting aside arbitration award on other grounds). In the one case upheld, the court found
that assuming arguendo that the public policy exception applied under the Railway Labor
Act, since the arbitration board found the drug test invalid, it did not yiolate any public
policy to reinstate the grievant to a safety-sensitive position in the railroad industry.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 175 F.3d 355, 358 (5th Cir.
1999).
91 See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
92 United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146, 149 (3d
Cir. 1988) (declining to decide the scope of the standard because assuming arguendo that
a public policy in favor of protecting employees and customers from violence exists, it
does not require employee's discharge when arbitrator found him amenable to
discipline); Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121,
125n.6 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that reinstatement of tire worker who drank alcohol on
work breaks does not conflict with any law or well-defined public policy); Kane Gas
Light & Heating Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Firemen & Oilers, Local 112, 687 F.2d 673, 682 (3d
Cir. 1982) (holding that arbitration award does not condone illegal act when employee
was suspended for reckless conduct which could have endangered life or caused property
damage).
93 United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 382
(3d Cir. 1995). Notably, the court read the public policy more narrowly in Suburban
Transit than in the several Exxon cases before the court. See infra notes 96-97 and
accompanying text.
94 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1295 (3d Cir.
1996) (deferring to arbitrator's finding that employer had no cause to require drug test,
but stating that if. there was cause to test, it would violate public policy to reinstate an
employee who refused the test based on employer's duty to ensure that impaired crew
members do not contribute to oil spills).
95 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993).
96 Id. at 364. Accordingly, the court found that reinstatement of a helmsman who
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not looking solely for a conflict with the law itself, but rather a conflict with
the purpose of the law, a broad interpretation of the exception.
The Eighth Circuit reviewed six awards, upholding three, overturning
two, and remanding one to the district court for a decision on the public
policy issue. 97 The Eighth Circuit adopted the broad standard in Iowa
Electric, Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, IBEW,98 in which the court
overturned an arbitration award that reinstated an employee terminated for
violating nuclear safety regulations.99 The employer terminated the employee
because it found the violation to be knowing and serious, such that the
employee could no longer be trusted.IOO The Eighth Circuit clearly focused
on the legality of underlying conduct, not the arbitration award. Three later
cases refused to overturn arbitration awards on various grounds unrelated to
the scope of the exception. IOI In a fifth case, the arbitration board reinstated
an employee based on a due process violation without determining whether
he posed a risk of working under the influence of alcohol or drugs, despite
tested positive for drugs violated the policy protecting the public and the environment,
citing Coast Guard regulations indicating that employees who tested positive '"shall be
denied employment ... or removed from duties which directly affect the safety of the
vessel's navigation or operations,' and may not return to work unless rehabilitation is
shown." Id. (citations omitted) (omission in original); accord Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1195-96 (3d Cir. 1993) (barring reinstatement of
oil tanker employee found intoxicated on duty despite lack of direct legal prohibition);
see also Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436,
1442 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding arbitration award violated public policy against sexual
harassment when arbitrator reinstated employee accused of harassment without
determining whether harassment occurred).
97 See infra notes 99-104 and accompanying text. In the remanded case, the lower
court had found that there was no public policy exception under the Railway Labor Act.
Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 820 F. Supp. 1198, 1203 (D. Neb. 1994). The
Eighth Circuit reversed, remanding for a determination as to whether the arbitration
award violated public policy. 23 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994). On remand, the lower
court found no public policy violation. 860 F. Supp. 676, 679 (D. Neb. 1994).
98 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
99 Id. at 1429.
100 Id.
lOI In Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, !BEW, 856 F.2d 1174, 1182 (8th Cir. 1988),
the attack on public policy challenged the arbitrator's authority to decide the issue. The
court rejected that argument and went further to distinguish the case from Iowa Electric
as involving only back pay to employees who failed an improper psychological screen for
employment at a nuclear power plant, not reinstatement of potentially dangerous
employees. Id. In both Alvey, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 132 F.3d 1209,
1212 (8th Cir. 1997) and Homestake Mining Co. v. USW, Local 7044, 153 F.3d 678, 681
(8th Cir. 1998), the court deferred to the arbitrator's factual findings that the employer
did not prove the employee engaged in the conduct alleged, and on that basis determined
that reinstatement of the employees did not violate public policy.
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federal regulations requiring that any employee who tests positive for drugs
or alcohol must be removed from service and cannot be reinstated unm the
employee has been evaluated for dependence, completed a rehabilitation
program, and tested negative.102 Because the employee was reinstated
without a determination as to future risk, the court concluded that the
arbitration award violated public policy and remanded for further findings.103
In . 1988, the Eleventh Circuit upheld one arbitration award and
overturned two, one on different grounds.104 The broadest interpretation was
in the latest of the three cases, the Delta Air Lines case discussed earlier.105
The court in Delta Air Lines stated that the test was whether "an established
public policy condemn[s] the performance of employment activities in the
manner engaged in by the employee."106 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit is
looking at whether the underlying conduct was both unlawful or against
public policy and integral to employment.107

102 Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1993).
103 Id. The court suggested the arbitrator could reinstate the employee if the
arbitrator found no signifi~ant risk to the public, because the employee could be trusted to
avoid substance abuse in the future. Id. at 263. The court appeared to be willing to defer
to arbitral findings on the possibility of rehabilitation, a narrower approach than the court
took in Iowa Electri1=.
104 See infra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.
105 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text.
106 Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861F.2d665, 671 (11th Cir.
1988).
107 In Florida Power Corp. v. !BEW, Local Union 433, 847 F.2d 680 (11th Cir.
1988), the court reversed the district coµ,rt's decision setting aside on public policy
grounds an arbitration award that reinstated an employee discharged bec~use he was
arrested for off-duty drug possession. The decision contains no discussion of the public
policy issue, but cites to the Supreme Court's Misco decision as the basis for reversal. Id.
at 681. In a case preceding Delta Air Lines, the court indicated agreement with the district
court's public policy rationale for vacating the arbitrator's award, but affirmed the
decision on different grounds because of the unsettled nature of the exception. United
States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 847 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1988).
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The First Circuit set aside two cases, one in 1984 and one in 1997.108 In
the first, the court struck down an arbitration award reinstating an employee
who embezzled from the Postal Service, citing statutes relating to conduct
and honesty of postal employees, as well as the importance of public trust
and the need to set an example for other employees.109 In the second, another
Exxon case, the court overturned an arbitration award reinstating a truck
driver who tested positive for drugs based on the "expanding public policy,"
noting that "[i]t makes no sense to construe public policy as encouragingand in some cases mandating--employers to establish and enforce drugtesting programs, yet to preclude them from taking decisive action against
those employees who test positive."110
While the correlation is not complete, it is clear from the above
discussion that, not surprisingly, in the circuits that have adopted narrower
public policy exceptions, the arbitration award is less likely to be overturned.
This is true both in the circuits that clearly require that the arbitration award
violate positive law and those that have looked for a direct conflict between
the law or public policy and the arbitration award. A review of the district
court decisions shows that of the twenty-five cases in which the courts
indicated whether they were applying a broad or narrow standard, twentythree applied a narrow standardll l and upheld the arbitration award while
only one court that applied a narrow standard struck down the arbitration
award. Of the courts expressly applying a broad standard, ten vacated the
arbitration award and three upheld it. Unquestionably, the scope of the
standard is not the only determinative factor, however, as courts applying a
narrow standard sometimes set aside arbitration awards, while courts
108

See infra notes 110-11 and accompanying text. Three other First Circuit cases
involved S.D. Warren Co. In the first, the court relied on criminal laws against drug use
and sale to vacate the arbitrator's reinstatement award on public policy grounds. S.D.
Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178, 187 (1st Cir.
1987). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded after Misco. 484 U.S. 983 (1987). The
court then reaffirmed its decision vacating the arbitration award, but did so on the ground
that the arbitrator exceeded her contractual authority. S.D. Warren Co. v. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 845 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1988). In a companion case
involving the same facts but a different arbitration award, the court followed the earlier
decision, concluding that the arbitrator exceeded authority. S.D. Warren Co. v. United
Paperworkers Int'! Union, Local 1069, 846 F.2d 827, 828 (1st Cir. 1988).
109 United States Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825 (1st
Cir. 1984). The court appeared to rely on the relationship of the conduct to employment,
disclaiming any public policy against requiring government to employ anyone convicted
of a crime. Id. at 825-26.
l 10 Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, 118 F.3d 841, 850 (1st Cir. 1997).
111 In this analysis, both the positive law approach and the intermediate approach of
the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Fourth Circuits are classified as narrow.
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applying a broad standard sometimes vacate them.
IV. THEPuBLICPOLICY AT ISSUE

As noted above, there are common ci,mses of discharge in the cases, and
accordingly, there are several public policies that repe~tedly serve as the
basis for arbitral award challenges. The most common are policies against
drugs, alcohol, sexual harassment, and violent behavior, and the policies
relating to vehicular safety, patient safety, and safety at nuclear facilities.112
Of the forty-eight cases involving drug use or drug testing, the arbitration
award was upheld in twenty-eight. Iri several, the courts found no public
policy against reinstating an employee who used drugs, declining to find
such a public policy in general criminal laws or laws authorizing employer
drug tests. 11 3 In others, the courts relied on the arbitrator's factual findings
that a test was improper or that the employee did not receive due process and
accordingly, the arbitration award did not establish that the employee used
drugs.114 Those cases in which the arbitration award was overturned
frequently involved jobs, such as truck drivers, railroad crew members, or
seamen, in which federal regulations against on-the-job drug use existed.115
112 This categorization is based on the cause for discharge, although the public
policy articulated by the court or urged by the employer is not always directly related to
the cause for discharge. E.g., Park Plaza Hotel v. Local 217, Hotel & Rest. Workers
Union, No. N-89-183, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15863 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 1990)
(rejecting employer's public policy argument based on public policy against perjury,
when employer alleged arbitration award reinstating employee who violated alcohol
policy was "procured by the grievant's perjured testimony''). B_ecause the public policy
was in most cases directly related to the cause for discharge, however, and because in a
number of cases the opinion did not reflect the public policy on which the employer
based its argument and the court found no public policy violation, the cases in this section
were categorized by cause for discharge.
l13 E.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th Cir.
1999); Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. SEIU, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.. 1997).
11 4 E.g., Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d '1287, 1295 (3d.
Cir. 1996); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. United Transp. Union, 175 F.3d 355, 358
(5th Cir. 1999).
115 The arbitration award was overturned in twelve cases, three on grounds other
than public policy. For cases overturned on public policy grounds, see Exxon Corp. v;
Esso Workers' Union, 118 F.3d at 850; Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem.
Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850, 856 (5th Cir. 1996); Gulf Coast Indus. Workers Union v.
Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993); Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp.
Union, 3 F.3d 255, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1993); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon ~eamen's
Union, 788 F. Supp. 829 (D.N.J. 1992), aff'd, 993 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1993); S.D. Warren
Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178, 187 (1st Cir. 1987);
115
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In most of these cases, however, the courts applied a broad view of the public
policy exception as the regulations did not expressly forbid reinstatement of
an employee who used drugs.116
Fifteen cases involved alcohol use, seven vacating the arbitration award
and eight sustaining it. The seven cases vacating the arbitration award
involved cases in which Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration,
Federal Railroad Administration, or Department of Transportation
regulations applied to pilots, railroad crews, tanker crews, or truck drivers.117
As noted above, however, application of the narrow standard resulted in
upholding reinstatement of a pilot who flew while intoxicated.118 Similarly,
the District Court in Massachusetts refused to set aside reinstatement of a
truck driver who was terminated for drinking on the job despite federal
Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 980 F. Supp. 752 (D.N.J.
1997); Ga. Power Co. v. !BEW, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Ga. 1989). For
cases overturned on other grounds, see S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers lnt'l
Union, Local 1069, 845 F.2d 3, 7 (1st Cir. 1988); S.D. Warren Co. v. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 846 F.2d 827, 828 (1st Cir. 1988); Logistics Pers.
Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 6 F. Supp. 2d 650 (E.D. Mich. 1998). Five
cases were remanded for further findings, including one in which the arbitration award
was set aside. See United Transp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R., 116 F.3d 430, 435 (9th Cir.
1997); Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 23 F.3d 1397, 1400 (8th Cir. 1994);
Union Pac. R.R. v. United Ttansp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 262-63 (8th Cir. 1993) (vacating
arbitration award and remanding); OCAW, Local No. 4-228 v. Union Oil Co., 818 F.2d
437, 442 (5th Cir. 1987). In Alvey, Inc. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, the court
found no public policy violation, but remanded on other grounds. 132 F.3d 1209, 121213 (8th Cir. 1998).
116 E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.2d 850
(5th Cir. 1996) (finding that arbitration award reinstating employee in safety-sensitive
position who tested positive for cocaine violated public policy); Gulf Coast Indus.
Workers Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that
arbitration award reinstating refinery process technician who tested positive for cocaine
violated public policy).
117 Exxon Shipping Corp. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 801 F. Supp. 1379 (D.N.J.
1992) (overturning arbitration award reinstating a seaman discharged for having blood
alcohol three to four times the limit allowed under Exxon and Coast Guard policy), aff'd,
11 F.3d 1189, 1195-96 (3d Cir. 1993); Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 794 F.
Supp. 891 (D. Neb. 1992) (overturning arbitration award reinstating employee who tested
positive for alcohol and drugs but remanding for a new hearing), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 3 F.3d 255 (8th Cir. 1993); Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, lnt'l, 686
F. Supp. 1573 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 665 (11th Cir. 1988); Amalgamated Meat
Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983)
(overturning arbitration award reinstating truck driver who was drinking on duty and had
an accident); Northwest Airlines v. Air Line Pilot's Ass'n, Int'l, 633 F. Supp. 779
(D.D.C. 1985), rev'd, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
118 See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
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regulations prohibiting the behavior, finding. that the regulations did not
require discharge.119 Again the scope of the standard had more impact than
the specific public policy at issue.
Of the fourteen cases involving employee violence-or threats of violence,
only two arbitration awards were overturned and both were reversed on
appeai.120 Despite the growing concern about workplace violence, courts
refused to set aside these arbitration awards even when applying a broad
public policy standard.121
Of the thirteen cases involving sexual harassment, six overturned the
arbitrator's decision and seven upheld it. The primary difference between the
cases upheld and those overturned was whether the court deemed upholding
the discharge necessary to. effectuate the public policy against sexual
harassment.122 Under a narrow view, it is clear that reinstatement does not
violate Title VII because courts in Title VII cases · have held that the
employer can remedy sexual harassment with lesser penalties for the
harasser.123 Thus, the scope of the exception is an important determinant in
sexual harassment cases. In addition, the arbitrator's findings regarding the
seriousness of the harassment, or the lack of such findings, appeared to
influence the courts as the severity of the harassment impacted the necessity
for severe punishment.124
119 Laidlaw Waste Sys., Inc. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 379, No. 88-0472,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6106 (D. Mass. May 16, 1990).
120 United States Postal Serv. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 663 F. Supp. 118
(W.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd, 839 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1988); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Grasselli Employees Indep. Ass'n, 118 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3312 (N.D. Ind. 1985), rev'd,
790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1986). One court remanded the case to an arbitrator to reconsider
the remedy on the basis that the prohibition on holding unioN office for one year, a
condition of reinstatement, conflicted with public policy. Hyde Park Cmty. Hosp. v.
Allied Serv. Div., Bhd. of Ry. Employees, No. 87-C-1315, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12053 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 1987).
121 E.g., G.B. Goldman Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 286,
957 F. Supp. 607, 618-22 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (failing to find that reinstatement would
violate the public policy of workplace safety, even though the court reviewed the
arbitrator's judgment in reinstating the employee de novo).
'
122 Compare Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local Union 676,
171 F.3d 971, 977 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that while there is a public policy against
sexual harassment, "[t]here is no public policy that every harass~r must be fired.") with
Newsday, Inc. v. Long Island Typographical Union, No. 915, 915 F.2d 840, 845 (2d Cir.
1990) (holding that reinstatement of employee fired for sexual harassment condones
misconduct and interferes with employer's legal duty to eliminate sexual harassment).
l23 Douglas E. Ray, Sexual Harassment, Labor Arbitration, and National Labor
Policy, 73 NEB. L. REV. 812, 833 (1994) and cases cited therein.
124 Stroehmann Bakeries v. Local 776, Int'I Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436, 1442
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Thirteen cases involved the public policy variously described as insuring
patient safety or insuring competent, licensed health care employees. 125 Of
these cases, two were overturned and one court stayed reinstatement pending
arbitration of new charges.126 In one overturned case, the arbitrator found
that the employee had been seriously negligent, had a propensity for
misconduct, and was reluctant to change her ways.127 In the other, the
arbitrator also found that the employee committed serious patient abuse, but
set aside the decision because the employee's supervisor had improperly
absented herself from the workplace.128 In each of the cases upheld, the court
found that the public policy did not bar reinstatement129 or deferred to the
arbitrator's findings that the employee did not commit patient abuse or was
unlikely to repeat the conduct. 130
(3d Cir. 1992) (overturning arbitration award when arbitrator failed to determine whether
harassment occurred, thereby interfering with employer's duty to eliminate harassment);
Newsday, 915 F.2d at 845 (holding that arbitrator's award of reinstatement interferes with
duty to eliminate harassment when employee had engaged in prior sexual harassment
which was the subject of a previous arbitrator's award indicating that any further
harassment should be grounds for immediate discharge).
125 Interestingly, all but one were district court cases.
126 In Washington Heights-W. Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Council, Inc. v. Dist.
I 199 Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees, the court, on public policy
grounds, stayed the reinstatement of a mental health worker charged with sexual abuse of
patients, enforcing only the arbitration award of back pay pending arbitration of new
issues raised by an amended complaint. 608 F. Supp. 395, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
127 Russell Mem'l Hosp. Ass'n v. USW, 720 F. Supp. 583, 587 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
The court in Russell expressly rejected the narrow or limitist view of the public policy
exception in public safety cases. Id. at 586 n.2. As noted previously, the Sixth Circuit has
adopted the intermediate view of the exception, requiring an explicit conflict with the
arbitration award, but has upheld the arbitration award in each of the nine cases it has
decided, most after the Russell case was decided. See supra note 73 and accompanying
text.
128 Highlands Hosp. v. AFSCME, 151 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2629, 2630 (W.D. Pa.
1996).
129 Jacksonville Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Gen. Serv. Employees Union,
Local 73, 888 F. Supp. 901, 908 (C.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that the issue is not whether
conduct for which employee was terminated violates public policy but whether
reinstatement of the employees who engaged in such conduct violates public policy).
l30 E.g., UPMC, Braddock v. Teamsters Local 250, 32 F. Supp. 2d 231, 235 (W.D.
Pa. 1998) (holding that reinstatement of long service employee with good record does not
violate public policy protecting psychiatric patient safety when policy allegedly violated
was not consistently enforced); Cabrini Med. Ctr. v. Local 1199, Drug, Hosp., & Health
Care Employees Union, 731 F. Supp. 612, 618-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding no public
policy violation when the arbitrator made no clear finding of patient abuse); Brigham &
Women's Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (D. Mass. 1988)
(finding no public policy violation when arbitrator reinstated registered nurse with
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There were ten vehicle safety cases that did not involve the use of drugs
or alcohol by the operator.131 Only two of the ten cases overturned the
arbitrator's award. The first was an early case in which the Ninth Circuit
found that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by ordering an airline to
allow a demoted pilot to retrain and attempt to requalify as a pilot after
repeated errors of judgment. 132 The court did not expressly use a public
policy exception, but in support of its decision cited Federal Aviation Act
regulations that impose a duty on the carrier to determine pilot
qualifications.133 In the other case, the court similarly overturned the
arbitration award reinstating a riverboat captain who was found to be grossly
careless on the basis that the arbitrator exceeded contractual authority, but
did not reach the public policy issue raised by the employer.134
Of the nine cases raising nuclear safety issues, three arbitration awards
were overturned, but two of those were reversed on appeal.135 In one case,
the court justified its refusal to overturn the arbitration award on .the basis
that the employees were only awarded back pay without reinstatement.136 In
excellent work record who failed to follow set procedure in a few instances); see also
Maggio v. Local 1199, 702 F. Supp. 989, 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Flushing Hosp. & Med.
Ctr. v. Local 1199, Drug, Hosp. & Health Care Employees Union, 685 F. Supp. 55, 57
(S.D.N.Y. 1988).
131 Two cases involved bus drivers, two involved airlines, four involved truck
drivers, one involved a river boat pilot, and the final case involved a mechanic who failed
to tighten lug nuts on vehicles on which he worked.
132 World Airways v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800, 803-04 (9th Cir. 1978).
133 Id.
134 Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng' rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d
599, 603 n.10 (5th Cir. 1989).
135 Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. Local Union 204, IBEW, 834 F.1d 1424 (8th Cir.
1987); Local 97, IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 96-CV-728, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20578 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1997) (holding that reinstatement of employee
who failed to respond to an alarm and lied about it conflicts with Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) regulations requiring trustworthy and reliable employees and
threatens public safety), rev'd, 196 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999) (refusing to set aside
arbitration award because of uncertainty as to whether NRC would bar reinstatement
based on its regulations); IBEW, Local 97 v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 950 F. Supp.
1227 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (overturning arbitration award reinstating employee who
adulterated drug test based on NRC regulations requiring trustworthy and reliable
employees who do not threaten public safety), rev'd, 143 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998)
(reversing because NRC regulations do not impose any sanctions for adulterating drug
tests and they encourage rehabilitation for first drug offense).
136 Daniel Constr. Co. v. Local 257, IBEW, 856 F.2d 1174, 1182 (8th Cir. 1988);
see also Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Tenn. Valley Trades & Labor Council, 184 F.3d 510, 520
(6th Cir. 1999) (refusing to set aside arbitration award reinstating nuclear reactor operator
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another, the award was upheld because the drug charges were not proven.137
Other cases turned on the court's application of the narrow exception
requiring a conflict between reinstatement and law or public policy.138
A. Public Safety

Closely related to the issue of which public policy is involved is the
matter of whether the court viewed the case as implicating public safety.
Some courts and commentators have emphasized the importance of the
public safety factor in public policy cases.139 For example, the Eighth Circuit
stated in Iowa Electric, that "[o]ur decision today is in keeping with the line
of cases vacating arbitrators' awards that direct the reinstatement of
employees whose deliberate acts have jeopardized public health or safety."140
The court went on to distinguish cases not involving public safety, noting
"labor awards directing the reinstatement of employees whose acts posed no
danger to public health or safety are usually upheld." 141 In the analysis on
this issue, cases were categorized as involving public safety when the court
expressly recognized that factor. Included were cases in which the court
demonstrated concern for the safety of other workers as well as for the
general public.142 Of the forty cases in whic~ courts overturned arbitration
awards, twenty-three were cases in which the court viewed public safety as a
factor in the decision.143 In a number of cases in which public safety was
who tested positive for drugs, finding that the arbitration award did not violate law or
regulations when it merely required reinstatement and a fair hearing to determine whether
the employee was fit for duty and entitled to a security clearance).
137 Bechtel Constr. Co. v. Laborers Dist. Council, No. 95-C-2616, 1988 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3832 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 25, 1988).
!38 Niagara Mohawk, 196 F.3d at 117; Niagara Mohawk, 143 F.3d at 718.
139 E.g., Exxon Shipping Co., 993 F.2d at 364; Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861 F.2d 665, 673 (11th Cir. 1988); Gear, supra note 49, at 87;
Stephen L. Hayford & Anthony V. Sinicropi, The Labor Contract and External Law:
Revisiting the Arbitrator's Scope ofAuthority, 2 J. DISP. REsOL. 249, 279 (1993).
140 Iowa Elec. Light & Power v. Local Union 204, IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424, 1428 (8th
Cir. 1987).
141 Id. at 1429.
14 2 In several of the cases in this category, the court expressly discussed worker
safety. E.g., G.B. Goldman Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 286,
957 F. Supp. 607, 618-20 (E.D. Pa. 1997); S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 186 (1st Cir. 1989).
143 E.g., Exxon Corp. v. Esso Workers' Union, 118 F.3d 841, 851 (stating that
forcing employer to reinstate employee who has no commitment to its drug free
workplace program to a safety-sensitive job thwarts employer's efforts to eliminate a
threat to the public); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great W. Food Co.,
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discussed but the arbitration award was upheld; the court used the narrow
public policy exception to find that although public safety might be
implicated by the conduct, it was not threatened by reinstatement of the
employee, either because the law did not prohibit reinstatement or because
the arbitrator made no finding that the conduct was likely to be repeated. 144
Clearly, the court's perception that public safety was at issue was an
important factor since over half of the vacated arbitration awards evidenced a
concern for public safety.145 The concern was overcome in many cases,
however, when the courts found no real threat to public safety resulting from
712 F.2d 122, 124 (5th Cir. 1983) (stating in overturning arbitration award reinstating
truck driver, "[a] driver who imbibes the spirits endangers not only his own life, but the
health and safety of all other drivers."). Two of the cases were decided on other grounds.
Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2, Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d 599 (5th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the court need not decide public policy issue when 40 year
employee was reinstated based on disparate treatment because arbitrator had no authority
to determine appropriate discipline once he found employee committed offense);
Logistics Pers. Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 6 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654-55
(E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that arbitrator exceeded contractual authority by imposing
additional requirements regarding drug testing so it was· unnecessary to reach public
policy issue regarding reinstatement to safety-sensitive position of employee who tested
positive for drugs). These cases were included because the broad standard of review
suggests that the court may have been influenced by public safety concerns to reverse on
other grounds. In addition, the World Airways, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978), case was officially decided on other grounds but
relied on a public policy analysis without articulating it as such. See supra note 69. Also,
one case cited worker safety as an important issue. S.D. Warren Co. v. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated, 484 U.S.
983 (1987) (vacating and remanding for reconsideration based on Misco). See supra note
109. Therefore, only seventeen overturned cases did not.cite public or worker safety.
l44 E.g., Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1216
(9th Cir. 1989) (holding that despite public interest in safe cars and trucks, there was no
showing that reinstatement of mechanic who failed to tighten lug nuts violates public
policy because there was no showing that he would engage in such wrongful conduct in
the future); Saint Mary Home, Inc. v. SEIU, Dist. 1199, 116 F.3d 41, 47 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that despite extensive regulation in the health care industry, no law prohibits
reinstatement of employee convicted of a drug offense).
145 In other cases, courts expressed concerns for public safety in ordering remands
for additional arbitral determinations. In OCA W, Local No. 4-228 v. Union Oil Co., the
court remanded for a determination of whether reinstatement would violate public policy
because of the employee's post-arbitration award drug use, which contradicted the
arbitrator's prediction regarding rehabilitation. 818 F.2d 437, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1987). In
Union Pacific Railroad v. United Transponation Union, the court remanded because the
arbitration board reinstated the employee based on a due process violation without
making any findings as to whether the employee was impaired by drugs or posed a risk to
the public because of drug use. 3 F.3d 255, 262 (8th Cir. 1993).
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reinstatement. Notably, many of the courts rejecting arbitration awards
applied the broad public policy exception; the concern for public safety was
based on the conduct that led to the termination.146
The Shelby County district court and court of appeals cases illustrate the
impact of the public safety concern. The United States District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee set aside the arbitral reinstatement of Deborah
Howery, who was discharged for participation in an illegal strike against the
Regional Medical Center. 147 The arbitrator had reinstated Howery without
back pay because he concluded that although Howery' s behavior was wrong,
termination was too severe a penalty. 148 The employer filed suit to vacate
based on public policy articulated in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), which prohibits strikes at health care institutions absent ten days
notice to the employer. 149 The NLRA also provides that any employee who
strikes during the notice period loses status as an employee of the employer,
unless and until he or she is reemployed by the employer.ISO The district
court emphasized that the notice requirements were essential to prevent
strikes that could '"endanger the lives and health of patients in health care
institutions. "'151 The court went on to find that both elements of the public
policy test were met. The NLRA provision established an explicit public
policy "intended to protect public safety" and the policy was violated by the
arbitration award because it ordered the employer to reinstate Howery when
the statute terminated her employee status and left reinstatement to the
employer's discretion.152

146 E.g., Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 861F.2d665, 674 (11th
Cir. 1989) (refusing to reinstate pilot who flew intoxicated because his conduct violated
FAA regulations); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 712 F.2d at 124 (overturning arbitration
award reinstating truck driver who drove while intoxicated based on laws prohibiting
such conduct).
147 Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. AFSCME, Local 1733, 756 F. Supp. 349,
350 (W.D. Tenn. 1991).
148 Id. The court of appeals elaborated on the reasons for reinstatement, noting that
Howery was a leader in the strike but not the instigator, and that she was a good, longterm employee engaged in atypical conduct that she reasonably believed would not risk
her job. Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. AFSC:ME, Local 1733, 967 F.2d 1091, 1093
(6th Cir. 1992). In addition, at the request of management she helped return employees to
work and the suspension period resulting from the arbitration award of reinstatement with
no back pay was over one year. Id. at 1094.
149 Shelby County, 756 F. Supp. at 351 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 158(g) (1994)).
150 Id.
l5l Id. (quoting NLRB v. Stationary Eng'rs, Local 39, 746 F.2d 530, 533 (9th Cir.
1984)).
152 Id. at 352.
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By way of contrast, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals never mentioned
public safety except in its quote from the district court's opinion. 153 Instead,
the court emphasized the limited role of the courts in reviewing arbitration
awards.154 In reversing the district court, the court of appeals held that the
statute did not mandate termination, but merely permitted it, and the
arbitration award did not take away the employer's discretion because the
employer had exercised its discretion in agreeing to arbitrate the issue of
Howery's termination.155 Accordingly, there was no conflict between the
arbitration award and the statute; the employer was merely seeking to escape
the consequences of its decision to arbitrate the termination.156
The distinction between these two decisions could be viewed in two
ways. One view is that the court that sees a threat to public safety is more
likely to invalidate an arbitration award. Another is that a court that disagrees
with an arbitration award may use public safety as a vehicle to overturn the
award. Regardless of the reason, it is apparent that judicial invocation of
public safety is strongly associated with decisions to vacate arbitration
awards.

B. Misconduct Integral to Employment
One factor cited by a few courts in determining whether public policy is
violated is whether "an established public policy condemn[s] the
performance of employment activities in the manner engaged in by the
employee[.]" 157 As articulated in Delta Air Lines, the argument is that public
policy is offended when an employer retains an employee who violated
public policy in the performance of employment duties, but not when the
153 Shelby County, 967 F.2d at 1096.
154 Id. at 1094-95.
l55 Id. at 1096-97.
156 Id. at 1097.
l57 Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'I, ~~1 F.2d 665, 671 (11th Cir.

1989). Later the court refers to whether the public policy "addresses disfavored conduct
which is inextricably related to the performance of employment duties ...." Id. at 674.
While the court purports to draw this principle from Misco, its precise origin seems to be
the court's attempt to distinguish Delta Air Lines from Misco and Florida Power Corp. v.
/BEW, Local Union 433, 847 F.2d 680 (11th Cir. 1988). Id. at 670. In each of those cases,
according to the court, the employee engaged in wrongdoing involving illegal drug use,
but was not making an employment decision in so doing as the drug use was either offpremises (Florida Power) or in the company parking lot (Misco). Id. at 671; see also Ga.
Power Co. v. IBEW, Local 84, 707 F. Supp. 531, 536 (N.D. Ga. 1989) (relying on Delta
Air Lines to find reinstatement of drug abuser violated public policy because his drug use
was integral to his employment).
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employer retains a person who has, for example, violated drug laws while on
vacation.158 Although this argument was influential in Delta Air Lines, it was
rarely articulated in the cases studied. In vacating an arbitration award in
United States Postal Service, the First Circuit noted that the misconduct was
directly related to the employee's job.159 In another case, the Sixth Circuit
upheld reinstatement of a truck driver charged with illegal drug use off duty,
distinguishing Delta Air Lines and Iowa Electric as involving on-the-job
misconduct.160 This distinction was made based on the company's reliance
on the two cases, but the court's decision actually turned on the conclusion
that the arbitration award, as opposed to the conduct leading to termination,
did not conflict with public policy.16l In several other cases, the court clearly
rejected the argument that misconduct integrally related to employment
conflicts with public policy, while off-duty misconduct does not. 162 In the
overwhelming majority of cases, however, there was no mention of this
factor. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that most of the cases challenging
arbitration awards as violative of public policy involved employees
terminated for misconduct on the job.

V. THE ARBITRATOR'S DECISION
The Supreme Court in Misco clearly directed the courts to defer to
factual findings of the arbitrator in reviewing arbitration awards on public
policy grounds. 163 Thus, the study looked at the impact of deference to
158 Delta Air Lines, 861 F.2d at 671.
159 United States Postal Serv. v. Am. Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822, 825 (1st
Cir. 1984).
l60 Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 89394 (6th Cir. 1990); see also Chrysler Motors Corp. v. Int'l Union of Allied Indus.
Workers, 748 F. Supp. 1352, 1362 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (upholding reinstatement of
employee who sexually harassed coworker, noting that the assault did not involve an act
integral to the employee's job as a fork lift operator). In a few other cases, the court
appears to rely, in part, on the fact that misconduct was unrelated to the job in finding no
conflict between reinstatement and a public policy against the misconduct. Monroe Auto
Equip. v. UAW, 981F.2d261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Interstate Brands); RackEng'g
Co. v. USW, No. 90-246, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19945 (W.D. Pa. June 22, 1990);
Equitable Gas Co. v. USW, 676 F. Supp. 648, 655 (W.D. Pa. 1987).
161 Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 893-94.
162 Stead Motors v. Auto. Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200, 1215-16 (9th
Cir. 1989) (upholding arbitration award); UAW Local 771 v. Micro Mfg. Co., 895 F.
Supp. 170, 174-75 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (upholding arbitration award); Exxon Co. v. Esso
Workers' Union, Inc., 118 F.3d 841, 849 (1st Cir. 1997) (overturning arbitation award on
basis that job relatedness not required for public policy conflict).
163 United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 44-45 (1987). The

124

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION AWARDS

arbitral findings of fact on outcomes of court decisions. A second, but
related, factor is the reason for the arbitrator's decision. Are courts more
likely to overturn awards when the arbitrator voids a termination based on
due process, disparate treatment, or mitigating factors such as length of
service rather than lack of proof of the misconduct?
A. The Arbitrator's Factual Findings
In thirty-two cases in the SUfVey, the court specifically relied on
deference to the arbitrator's findings of fact to uphold the decision of the
arbitrator against a public policy challenge.164 In some cases, the court relied
on the arbitrator's factual findings that the employee was amenable to
discipline or rehabilitation and this was an important factor for the court.165
In others, the arbitrator's finding that the employer did not prove that the
employee committed the violation alleged was a significant factor.166 In still
others, as in Misco, the arbitrator did not draw the inference requested by the
employer and the court refused to do so. For example, in Brigham &
Women's Hospital, the arbitrator set aside the termination of a nurse for
failure to meet expected nursing_ standards when the hospital failed to follow
Court stated:
To conclude from the fact that marijuana had been found in Cooper's car that
Cooper had ever been or would be under the influence of marijuana while he was on
the job and operating dangerous machinery is an exercise in fact-finding about
Cooper's use of drugs and his amenability to discipline, a task that exceeds the
authority of a court asked to overturn an arbitration award. The parties did not
bargain for the facts to be found by a court, but by an arbitrator chosen by them who
had more opportunity to observe Cooper and to be familiar with the plant and its
problems. Nor does the fact that it is inquiring into a possible violation of public
policy excuse a court for doing the arbitrator's task.

Id.
l64 In one of the thirty-two cases the court found no public policy violation based on
the arbitrator's findings of fact, but overturned the decision on other grounds. Alvey, Inc.
v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 132 F.3d 1209, 1211-12 (8th Cir. 1997).
165 E.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Nat' I Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 839 F.2d 146,
149 (3d Cir. 1988); Rack Eng' g Co. v. USW, No. 90-246, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19945
(W.D. Pa. June 22, 1990) (upholding arbitration award on basis, inter alia, that arbitrator
may have concluded that employee was amenable to discipline). Included in this category
are cases in which the arbitrator found that the conduct that led to the termination was
unlikely to recur. E.g., Jacksonville Area Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Gen. Serv.
Employees Union, Local 73, 888 F. Supp. 901, 908, n.9 (C.D. Ill. 1995).
166 E.g., Maggio v. Local 1199, 702 F. Supp. 989, 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding
that reinstatement did not violate public policy against patient abuse since the arbitrator
did not find that employee abused patients).
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its own disciplinary rules. 167 The employer argued to the court that the
decision violated the public policy requiring competent registered nurses. 168
fu rejecting the employer's plea, the court stated:
The arbitrator did not find that Morgan was incompetent, or that Morgan
was unable to properly carry out the basic responsibilities of an RN. Nor is
this Court in a position to make such a finding. The parties bargained for the
arbitrator, not the courts, to be the factfinder in labor disputes. 169
The factual findings of the arbitrator were also relied on by a few courts
to overturn arbitral decisions. The cases were primarily those in which the
arbitrator concluded that the employee committed the termination offense,
but set aside the decision on other grounds, such as due process170 or
disparate treatment.171 For example, in Niagara Mohawk, the arbitrator
reinstated a nuclear security officer discharged for failure to answer an alarm
and lying about it to his superiors.172 The arbitrator's decision was based
both on violation of due process and on the severity of the discharge in
relation to the violation.1 73 The court reversed the decision of the arbitrator,
holding that NRC regulations require employees to be trustworthy and
reliable and the employee here could be neither since the arbitrator
specifically found him to be untruthfuI. 174 This decision, however, was
reversed by the Second Circuit.175
167 Brigham & Women's Hosp. v. Mass. Nurses Ass'n, 684 F. Supp. 1120, 1121-22
(D. Mass. 1988).
168 Id. at 1125.
169 Id.
170 Arbitrators frequently reverse termination decisions by employers that do not
comport with "basic notions of fairness or due process." ELKOURI & ELKOURI, How
ARBITRATION WORKS 918 (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997).
171 Inconsistent enforcement of rules frequently will result in arbitral invalidation of
termination absent justification for differential treatment. Id. at 934-35.
!72 Local 97, IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., No. 96-CV-728, 1997 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20578, at *l (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1997).
17 3 Id. at *6.
174 Id.; see also Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 980 F.
Supp. 752 (D.N.J. 1997) (setting aside arbitral decision reinstating employee who tested
positive for drug use after rehabilitation based on lack of proof that chain of custody of
specimen was followed); Westvaco Corp. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local
Union 676, No. 97-0753-R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8109, at *15 (W.D. Va. Mar. 26,
1998) (setting aside decision of arbitrator reinstating employee who engaged in sexual
harassment because company did not follow progressive discipline), rev'd, 171 F.3d 971
(4th Cir. 1999).
!75 Local 97, IBEW v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 196 F.3d 117, 130--31 (2d
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Despite Misco, a few courts have suggested that when public policy is at
issue, less deference is due to arbitral fact-finding. 176 Apparently following
this reasoning, in some cases the court has engaged in its own fact-finding. In
Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, the Third Circuit upheld the district court's decision to vacate an
arbitration award reinstating an employee accused of sexual harassment. 177
The arbitrator did not decide whether the employee engaged in sexual
harassment, but overturned the discharge because the employer violated the
employee's right to due process by failing to give him a complete
opportunity to tell his side of the story. The court found that the decision
violated public policy because the arbitrator reinstated the employee without
fully considering the evidence of sexual harassment.178 Furthermore, the
court determined that the arbitrator erred in concluding that the grievant' s
due process rights were violated, agreeing with the district court's decision to
remand for a determination by a different arbitrator.179 In dissent, Judge
Becker roundly criticized the majority opinion for lack of deference to the
arbitrator's fact-finding, citing Misco.180 Stroehmann provides a telling
example of the concern of opponents of a broad public policy exception. The
majority clearly disagreed with the decision, perhaps rightly so, 181 and
therefore reached out for grounds on which to reverse the arbitrator,
intruding impermissibly into the fact-finding function of the arbitrator.

Cir. 1999).
176 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees' Indep. Ass'n, 790 F.2d
611, 617 (7th Cir. 1986) (suggesting but not deciding that less deferential review of facts
might be more appropriate in public policy cases); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon
Seamen's Union, 788 F. Supp. 829, 840 (D.N.J. 1992) (applying less deferential review
of facts to strike down arbitration award _reinstating helmsman who tested positive for
drugs after ship ran aground).
177 Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 776, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436,
1438 (3d Cir. 1992).
178 Id.
179 Id. Judge Hutchinson, in a footnote, indicated that he would overturn the
arbitrator's award even if he agreed that the grievant's due process rights were violated
since public policy trumps due process concerns. Id. at 1445 n.7.
180 Id. at 1447-54.
18l The arbitrator's opinion contained disturbing suggestions of insensitivity to
sexual harassment claims, including emphasis on such irrelevant facts as the appearance
and social life of the woman who complained about the harassment, and the marital status
of the accused harasser. Id. at 1440. In addition, the arbitrator ignored testimony that
confirmed the woman's version of the facts. Id.
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B. The Arbitrator's Reason
In twenty-six cases in the sample, the arbitrator reversed an employer's
decision to discharge at least in part on due process grounds.18 2 In twelve
cases, the court overturned the decision, in thirteen the court upheld the
decision, and the other case was remanded to the district court to apply the
public policy exception. The difference between the cases overturned and
those upheld was often whether the court applied a broad or a narrow
standard. 183
The impact of the standard chosen is less clear in the fifty-two cases in
which the arbitrator determined that the discipline was too severe based on
the nature of the violation, the employee's work record, or both.18 4 In
eighteen of those cases, the court overturned the arbitration award on public
policy grounds. In eight of the eighteen, the court clearly used a broad test.185
In the others, the test applied was unclear, except for one case, which used
the narrow test.1 86 In the other thirty-three, the court declined to reverse the
182 If the arbitrator mentioned several bases for the decision, the case was counted in
each category.
l 83 In seven of the eleven cases reversed, the trial court applied a broad standard,
while only one court applied the narrow standard; in the other three, the standard applied
was unclear. In Union Pacific Railroad v. United Transportation Union, 794 F. Supp.
891 (D. Neb. 1992), the court used an intermediate standard to vacate the arbitrator's
award-the court based its decision on the conflict between reinstatement and the public
policy against employing a railway employee who uses drugs or alcohol, as well as a
regulation that conditioned reinstatement upon evaluation for substance abuse problems,
rehabilitation, and testing negative for drugs or alcohol. Id. at 894-95. For the purposes
of this study, cases in which the intermediate standard was applied were considered to
have used a narrow standard. More typical is Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union
540 v. Great Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122, 125-26 (5th Cir. 1983), in which the
court, based on due process violations, applied the broad standard to overturn an
arbitrator's reinstatement of a truck driver caught drinking on the job. In eight of the
thirteen cases upheld, the court applied a narrow standard, in one case the broad standard,
and in the other four cases the standard applied was unclear. !BEW, Local 97 v. Niagara
Mohawk Power Corp., 143 F.3d 704 (2d Cir. 1998), is typical of the cases upholding the
arbitration award based on a narrow standard. Id. at 714-28 (upholding an arbitration
award which reinstated, on due process grounds, a nuclear plant employee who tested
positive for drugs); see also supra notes 72-73, 131 and accompanying text. Again in
these statistics, the intermediate approach was considered narrow.
184 This category includes cases in which the arbitrator found that the employer
improperly failed to apply progressive discipline.
l85 E.g., Gulf Coast Indus. Union v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 991F.2d244, 254-55 (5th
Cir. 1993); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 11 F.3d 1189, 1195 (3d Cir.
1993).
186 Shelby County Health Care Corp. v. AFSCME, Local 1733, 756 F. Supp. 349
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arbitrator's decision. In sixteen of the cases upheld, the court yXpressly
applied the narrow public policy exception. 187 Only two cases upholding an
arbitration award applied the broad exception;188 in the others, the scope of
the exception was unclear. Although the correlation is less complete than in
the due process cases, that is so because a larger riumber of cases did not
specify the standard being applied. Courts rarely overturned cases using the
narrow standard or upheld them using the broad standard.
In twenty-three cases, the arbitrator found that the employer did not
prove that the employee committed the conduct alleged.189 Seventeen of
these decisions were upheld, five overturned, and one remanded. In four of
the five cases overturned, the court applied the broad test. Three were drug
cases, two in which the arbitrator found that proper testing requirements were
not met, and one in which the arbitrator found no violation of the drug
policy, without finding no drug use.190 The other tWo cases were the two
(W.D. Tenn. 1991), rev'd, 961F.2d1091, 1098 (6th Cir. 1992); see supra notes 148-57
and accompanying text. In some cases, the scope of the standard was not addressed in the
decision because the court found no well-defined and dominant public policy. In others,
the court, without specifically determining the standard, found that the arbitration award
did not conflict with the policy. In the remaining cases, the court found a conflict without
addressing the scope of the standard.
187 E.g., Shelby County, 967 F.2d at 1096-97; Jacksonville Area Ass'n for Retarded
Citizens v. Gen. Serv. Employees Union, Local 73, 888 F. Supp. 901, 909 (C.D. III.
1995) (upholding reinstatement of employees who mentally abused client when no law
prohibited their reinstatement). As defined here, the narrow exception included the
approach of the D.C. Circuit, requiring a violation of positive law, and the intermediate
approach of the Second Circuit, requiring a clear conflict between public policy and
reinstatement. See supra notes 66, 70-72 and accompanying text.
188 In both cases, the factual evidence presented to the arbitrator played an important
role in the court's decisions. G.B. Goldman Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l
Union, Local 286, 957 F. Supp. 607, 618-22 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (applying broad public
policy and reviewing arbitrator's determination on reinstatement de nova, but declining
to overturn arbitration award, because despite employer's argument to the court alleging
the dangerous propensities of the employee, no such evidence was presented to the
arbitrator); UPMC, Braddock v. Teamsters Local 250, 32 F. Supp. 2d 231, 233, 235
(W.D. Pa. 1998) (applying broad public policy, yet reinstating employee, deferring to
arbitrator's factual findings regarding severity of conduct and likelihood of repetition).
189 Included in this category are cases in which the arbitrator excluded evidence or
found a drug or alcohol test unjustified under the requirements of the collective
bargaining agreement.
190Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers Union, 77 F.3d 850, 853
(5th Cir. 1996) (upholding reinstatement by arbitrator who found that the employee did
not violate a drug policy that specified certain offenses as justifying termination without
advance notice); Logistics Pers, Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 299, 6 F. Supp.
2d 650, 655 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (overturning arbitration award because arbitrator
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opinions in the Stroehmann case in which the arbitrator not only found
insufficient evidence to show that sexual harassment occurred, but also found
a due process violation.191 As noted, the courts rejected the arbitrator's
factual findings, suggesting arbitrator bias and insensitivity.
Two cases upholding decisions applied the narrow standard, and two the
broad standard. However, most cases did not specify the standard. Many of
these cases relied on deference to arbitral fact-finding, making it unnecessary
to discuss the standard explicitly.
The arbitrator in ten cases set aside the termination based on the
employer's disparate treatment of the grievant. In six of the cases, the court
upheld the arbitrator's award, while it overturned the arbitration award in the
other four cases. Of the six cases in which the arbitration award was upheld,
four courts expressly applied a narrow standard of review.19 2 Another case
arose in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and while the court
did not expressly cite the standard of review, 193 it is clear from prior cases
that the narrow standard would apply.194 The fifth case upheld, an early case
from the Eastern District of Missouri, rejected the public policy argument
without discussion. 195 Two of the four cases overturning arbitration awards
exceeded authority by imposing additional testing requirements on the employer that
were not in the collective bargaining agreement); Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, Int'!
Bhd. of Teamsters, 980 F. Supp. 752, 769 (D.N.J. 1997) (overturning based on broad
public policy against drug use, not because position was safety-sensitive, but because
reinstatement would condone employee's conduct).
191 See supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
192 Dyno-Nobel, Inc. v. USW, Local 13226, 77 F. Supp. 2d 307, 308 (N.D.N.Y.
1999) (applying the Second Circuit standard); Container Corp. v. United Paperworkers
Int'! Union, Local 208, No. CV-93-5773, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19934 (C.D. Cal. Mar.
31, 1994); Park Plaza Hotel v. Local 217, Hotel & Rest. Workers' Union, No. N-89-183,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15863 (D. Conn. Aug. 21, 1990) (refusing to set aside arbitration
award on public policy grounds when relief ordered did not violate public policy);
Laidlaw Waste Sys. v. Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 379, No. 88-0472, 1990 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6106 (D. Mass. May 16, 1990) (upholding reinstatement because no public policy
requires permanent discharge of vehicle operator drinking on the job and other employees
were not terminated).
l93 CWA v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia, 27 F. Supp. 2d 66, 71 (D.D.C. 1998). The
court did not discuss the standard because it found that enforcement of the arbitration
award reinstating an accused sexual harasser did not violate public policy since the
arbitrator found, as a factual matter, that no sexual harassment occurred. Id.
194 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
195 Vulcan-Hart Corp. v. Stove, Furnace & Allied Appliance Workers Int'! Union,
Local No. 110, 516 F. Supp. 394, 399 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd, 671 F.2d 1182, 1185 (8th
Cir. 1982). Since the case was affirmed on other grounds without mention of the public
policy issue, the court of appeals opinion was not included in the cases analyzed in the
study.
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were decided on other grounds, and the other two were the two opinions in
the Delta Air Lines case discussed in Part ill, in which a broad standard was
applied.196 Again the standard applied had a strong effect on the outcome.
Finally, some courts evinced a concern for arbitral decisions that
reinstated employees on due process or other grounds without determining
whether the employee committed the acts alleged. These courts overturned
the arbitral decision, and, in most cases, remanded to the arbitrator for further
proceedings. The rationale of the courts was that it violated public policy to
reinstate an employee who might have committed a violation without first
determining whether in fact the employee engaged in the alleged misconduct.
For example, in Union Pacific Railroad, the court overturned the decision of
the arbitration board to reinstate, based on due process violations, an
employee who tested positive for drugs and alcohol, because regulations
required rehabilitation and counseling of drug and alcohol abusers prior to
returning them to employment. 197 The court ordered a remand to the
arbitration board for additional factual investigation and reconsideration of
the remedy.198 Similarly, even without such express regulations, the court in
Stroehmann overturned an arbitration award reinstating an employee accused
of sexual harassment when the arbitrator failed to determine whether the
harassment occurred.199
196 Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 889 F.2d
599, 603--04 & n.10 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that the arbitrator exceeded his authority by
reinstating the employee after finding proper cause for discipline and therefore declining
to reach the public policy issue); S.D. Warr~n Co. v. United Paperworkers lnt'I Union,
Local 1069, 846 F.2d 827, 828 (1st Cir. 1988) (after remand from the Supreme Court to
reconsider the decision in light of United Papetworkers Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29
(1987), the court decided that the arbitrator exceeded his authority in ordering
reinstatement after finding a rule violation); Delta Air Lines v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n,
Int'!, 686 F. Supp. 1573, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 665, 672-73 (11th Cir.
1988)
197 Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 262 (8th Cir. 1993); cf.
Union Pac. R.R. v. United Transp. Union, 860 F. Supp. 676, 679 (D. Neb. 1994)
(upholding reinstatement under similar circumstances when the arbitration board required
rehabilitation prior to reinstatement); see also United Transp. Union v. Union Pac. R.R.,
116 F.3d 430, 435 (9th Cir. 1997) (reversing district court's decision to overturn
arbitration award and remand for determination as to whether employee used drugs).
198 Union Pac. R.R., 3 F.3d at 264.
199 Stroehmann Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 766, Int'! Bhd. of Teamsters, 969 F.2d 1436,
1442, 1446-47 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming the district court). The court in Stroehmann
went so far as to remand to a different arbitrator based on the bias exhibited by the
arbitrator. Id. at 1447; see also United Transp. Union v. Burlington N. R.R., 864 F. Sµpp.
138, 142 (D. Ore. 1994) (finding that public policy against sexual harassment conflicts
with arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee on due process grounds without
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VI. ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
What can be learned from the above discussion that would be of value to
arbitrators and parties involved in arbitration? The analysis suggests the
importance of certain factors in the arbitrator's decision as well as the
importance of the standard of review used by the court. This information is
useful to both parties and arbitrators in planning the factual and legal
presentation to the arbitrator, in drafting the opinion, in deciding whether and
where to challenge or seek enforcement of the decision, and in making
arguments to the court.

A. The Arbitration
Recognizing cases that are likely to generate public policy challenges
will enable parties to make necessary arguments to the arbitrator. As noted,
cases in which the employee has engaged in conduct arguably affecting
public safety are ripe for public policy arguments, to which courts are
frequently receptive. Employees involved in transportation of the public or of
environmentally dangerous substances, as well as employees in industries
using nuclear power or chemical substances, are likely to see such
challenges. Similarly, reinstatements of empioyees in health care positions
that involve patient safety are often subject to public policy challenge.
Discharges for drug use are by far the most common in the public policy
arena. When the Drug Free Workplace Act or regulations of the Department
of Transportation, Coast Guard, Federal Railroad Administration, or Federal
Aviation Administration apply, a public policy issue is most likely to be
raised because of the statutory or regulatory source for the public policy.
Alcohol use and sexual harassment, which is prohibited by Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act and many state laws, run close behind. When these factors
are present, the parties and the arbitrator should anticipate possible public
policy issues.
The employer recognizing this possibility must determine whether to
raise the public policy issue before the arbitrator or leave it to the courts. The
risk in raising it before the arbitrator is that an adverse determination by the
arbitrator might make a judicial challenge more difficult. The Supreme Court
has said, however, that the public policy issue is for the courts.200 The
arbitrator may address the issue, but clearly cannot preclude judicial
reconsideration. While some courts have held that an arbitral error in
determining whether he engaged in sexual harassment).
200 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber Workers,
461 U.S. 757, 766 (1983).
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interpreting law is not a basis for overturning an arbitration award, when the
public policy issue is deemed within the judicial role, the court may be more
likely to review the matter de nova. Moreover, failµre to present to the
arbitrator the evidence necessary , for a determination that reinstatement
violates public policy may later prevent the employer from proving its case
in court.201 However, raising the issue creates a risk that the arbitrator might
make a factual determination that makes it difficult for a court to find that
public policy has been violated. For example, if the arbitrator finds that the
employee did not violate law creating the public policy, then even courts that
apply a broad standard may uphold the arbitration award.
Raising the public policy issue may prompt the arbitrator to address the
possibility of rehabilitation or recurrence of the conduct. A factual finding
that the employee is rehabilitated or unlikely to repeat the conduct renders
the employer's . challenge more difficult, as many courts defer to the
arbitrator's findings of fact. Nevertheless, a persuasive argument by the
employer on the public policy issue may win the arbitration, making judicial
challenge unnecessary. This provides substaDtial time and cost savings to the
employer and encourages finality of labor arbitration awards. Moreover, the
arbitrator may well address these factual issues regardless of whether the
employer urges a public policy basis for upholding the termination.
The employer could present evidence that would support factual findings
that rehabilitation is unlikely. For example, in a drug or alcohol abuse case,
evidence of prior unsuccessful rehabilitation, or of addiction, may persuade
the arbitrator or the court that recurrence of the conduct is more likely. Even
if the arbitrator makes no such finding, a court applying a broad test and
concerned about public safety may make an inference the arbitrator did
not.202 However, failure to present such evidence to the arbitrator may lead
the court to find no public policy violation because of the lack of such
evidence.203
From the union's perspective, recognition of the possibility of a public
policy challenge to a successful grievance should prompt consideration of the
201 G.B. Goldman Paper Co. v. United Paperworkers lnt'l Union, Local 286, 957 F.

Supp. 607, 622 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
'
202 In my view, such an inference by the court is improper under Misco. But see
Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, lnt'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 980 F. Supp. 752, 769 (D.N.J.
1997) (setting aside arbitrator's award reinstating drug user who had relapsed after
rehabilitation and adulterated a test, applying a broad exception as employee was not in a
designated safety-sensitive job and regulations did not directly apply).
203 E.g., Goldman, 951 F. Supp. at 622 (refusing to infer that employee is too
dangerous for reinstatement when employer had opportunity to present such evidence to
the arbitrator and did not do so).
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arguments to be made. Because a number of courts have upheld decisions
based on deference to arbitral factual findings regarding existence of a
violation or possibility of rehabilitation, union evidence and arguments
should be tailored to lead to such findings when possible. When there is an
argument that the employee did not commit an act in violation of law,
success on such an argument will limit the possibility that the arbitration
award will be overturned. This may require not only factual evidence as to
whether the employee committed the act, but some knowledge of the law.
For example, an element of a claim for hostile environment sexual
harassment is that the harassment is unwelcome. 204 When the conduct is not
unwelcome by the person harassed, no violation of the law has occurred. In
CWA v. Bell Atlantic-West Virginia,205 the arbitrator found that both the male
employee discharged and the female employee complaining of sexual
harassment participated in improper sexual conduct and therefore, the male
employee's conduct was not unwelcome.206 The arbitrator found disparate
treatment based on the discharge of the male and retention of the female and
set aside the termination. 207 The court rejected the employer's public policy
challenge, deferring to the arbitrator's conclusion that the male employee's
conduct did not constitute sexual harassment. 208 Since there was no sexual
harassment, reinstatement of the employee could not violate the public policy
against sexual harassment in the workplace. 209
A union's thorough understanding of federal or state regulations relating
to workplace drug or alcohol use could lead to similar arguments. When the
regulations require removal, from safety-sensitive positions, of an employee
testing positive for drug or alcohol use, for example, the union might have an
argument as to what constitutes a safety-sensitive position.210 Alternatively,

204 E.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). While it has been
argued strongly that unwelcomeness is an inappropriate criterion to apply in sex
discrimination cases, it remains a part of the standard at present. For scholars arguing
against application of this criterion, see Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1729-32 (1998); Linda E. Epstein, What is a Gender
Norm and Why Should We Care? Implementing a New Theory in Sexual Harassment
Law, 51 STAN. L. REV. 161, 181 (1998); Miranda Oshige, What's Sex Got to Do with It?,
47 STAN. L. REV. 565, 576-83 (1995).
205 27 F. Supp. 2d 66 (D.D.C. 1998).
206 Id. at 68.
207 Id. at 70--71.
208 Id. at 71.
209 Id.
210 But see Exxon Corp. v. Local Union 877, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 980 F. Supp.
752, 769 (D.N.J. 1997) (overturning arbitration award although position not designated as
safety-sensitive).
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the union could urge that the arbitrator's remedy be tailored to the
requirements of the statute. The union could seek back pay only,
reinstatement to a non-safety-sensitive position, or reinstatement conditioned
upon successful completion of a rehabilitation program, perhaps paid for by
the employer.211 The precise argument, of course, will depend upon the facts
relating to the termination, the language of the statute or regulations, and the
provisions of the collective bargaining agreement. A remedy calculated to
anticipate public safety concerns could go a long way toward shielding the
arbitration award from successful challenge.
Similarly, when facts and the collective bargaining agreement permit, the
union should argue that the employee can be rehabilitated with a lesser
penalty than discharge, or that the conduct was an aberration unlikely to be
repeated. An argument for use of progressive discipline also fits clearly in
this category. If the arbitrator makes such a finding, the union can urge a
court to defer to that conclusion. While many courts have done so, such a
finding does not insulate the decision from an activist court. In Exxon
Shipping Co., the court set aside the arbitrator's reinstatement of an
employee, despite the absence of evidence or findings relating to the
211 In Misco, the Court noted that the arbitration award required the employee to be
reinstated to his former job or an equivalent job for which he was qualified, stating that
"[i]t is by no means clear from the record that Cooper would pose a serious threat to the
asserted public policy in every job for which he was qualified." 484 U.S. 29, 45 (1987);
see also MidMichigan Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Prof' I Employees Div. of Local 79, 183 F.3d
497, 505 (6th Cir. 1999) (upholding reinstatement of nurse when arbitrator found that her
errors were minor and allowed hospital to reinstate her to any job, not limiting the
hospital to reinstatement to the intensive/progressive care unit with the most critically ill
patients); United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51F.3d376, 382
(3d Cir. 1995) (upholding arbitration award reinstating bus driver who had a number of
accidents when the arbitrator's award encouraged retraining); Union Pac. R.R. v. United
Transp. Union, 3 F.3d 255, 263 (8th Cir. 1993) (suggesting that the arbitrator could order
the railroad to reimburse the employee for a rehabilitation program, order reinstatement
to a position that does not implicate public safety, or create another unique sanction that
prevents employer abuse while.protecting the public safety); Daniel Const. Co. v. Local
257, IBEW, 856 F.2d 1174, 1182 (8th Cir. 1988) (public policy considerations not
implicated by an arbitration award of back pay as opposed to reinstatement); Washington
Heights-W. Harlem-Inwood Mental Health Council, Inc. v. Dist. 1199, Nat'l Union of
Hosp. & Health Care Employees, 608 F. Supp. 395, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (staying
reinstatement of mental health worker accused of sexual abuse of patients but requiring
payment of back pay). But see Exxon Corp. v. Baton Rouge Oil & Chem. Workers
Union, 77 F.3d 850, 855-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (refusing to enforce arbitration award despite
the fact that the arbitrator's award provided for a year's back pay if the grievant was
unavailable for reinstatement and both the union and the employer agreed that he was
unavailable. The court found that even back pay would condone misconduct, thereby
violating public policy).
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likelihood of repetition or future violations. 212 The court relied on the Coast
Guard regulations, which required termination or removal from safetysensitive duties after a positive drug test, and conditioned reinstatement on
the determination of the company's Medical Review Officer that the
employee was drug free and the risk of future drug use was low enough to
justify a return to work. 213 Notably, however, the employee tested negative at
the Coast Guard screening level and the Coast Guard took no action against
him.214
Successful arguments for findings that conduct is unlikely to be repeated
may be made when the employee conduct was unintentional or unknowing.
When a rule is not clear, or when insufficient notice was given to the
employee that conduct was wrongful, the union should not only make the due
process argument, but should go on to argue that the conduct is unlikely to be
repeated after clarification of the rule. For example, in Braddock, the court
upheld the arbitrator's award reinstating a hospital employee terminated for
failing to keep a suicidal patient under constant observation.215 The court
relied on the arbitrator's finding that the hospital had never indicated to the
admittedly competent and experienced employee that his interpretation of the
policy was incorrect, stating: "[t]here was simply no evidence indicating that
Simko would refuse to act in a manner consistent with the newly clarified
'arm's length' policy."216
With the exception of these issues, the reason for the arbitrator's decision
does not seem to have a significant impact. The arbitrator's factual findings
regarding whether the employee committed the offense and whether the
employee is amenable to discipline are clearly significant. The success of the
public policy challenge does not seem to be affected substantially by whether
the discharge was overturned on due process grounds, disparate treatment
grounds, or the severity of the discipline in relation to the violation and the
212 Exxon Shipping Co. v. Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 365-67 (3d Cir.
1993).
213 Id. at 365.

214 Id. at 366.
215 UPMC, Braddock v. Teamsters Local 250, 32 F. Supp. 2d 231, 235 (W.D. Pa.
1998).

216 Id. The court also relied on the arbitrator's finding that the most serious of the
charges against the employee was unproven. Id.; see also Flushing Hosp. & Med. Ctr. v.
Local 1199, Drug, Hosp., & Health Care Employees Union 685 F. Supp 55, 56-57
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that when employee was not told conduct was prohibited and
her experience suggested that she could change IV bags under limited circumstances, her
reinstatement after termination for performing an unauthorized procedure in what she
reasonably believed to be an emergency did not violate public policy, since there is no
threat of continuing improper conduct).
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employee's record. Nor does the question of whether the employee's conduct
is integral to employment matter to most courts. In courts that have
emphasized that factor, however, the union defending a decision reinstating
an employee for off-the-job conduct should consider the argument. In
addition, when the conduct is off-duty, i.e., a positive drug test with no
evidence of impairment, the union should urge an arbitral conclusion that
there is no evidence that suggests that such conduct will occur on the job,
thereby threatening public health or safety. 217 Similarly, when the conduct is
job-related, the employer will want to make that point to the court in such a
jurisdiction.
The arbitrator desiring to shield the arbitration award from challenge and
preserve its finality should take note of the concerns articulated above.
Recognizing cases in which a public policy argument may be raised is the
first step. In considering whether just cause exists, the arbitrator must
determine whether to consider the external law creating· the public policy
issue. There is an ongoing debate in the arbitral community about whether
arbitrators can or should consider external law in their decisions. 21 8 The
decisions at issue here will primarily involve construction of the terms ''just
cause," "cause" or "good cause" for termination, as ·most collective
bargaining agreements contain such a provision.21 9 The agreement may
further incorporate specific rules of conduct or authorize the employer to
establish reasonable rules, which then, of course, must be· considered by the
arbitrator.220 In some cases, the agreement may actually contain a reference
to external law, either generally, stating that the employer agrees to comply
217 See, e.g., Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. Becker, 195 F.3d 1201, 1206 (10th
Cir. 1999); Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. UAW, 981 F.2d 261, 269 (6th Cir. 1992).
21 8 See generally David E. Feller, The Coming End of Arbitration's Golden Age, 29
NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 97 (1976); Robert G. Howlett, A Reprise, 21 NAT'L
ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 64 (1968); Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB, and
the Courts, 20 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 67 (1967); Bernard D. Meltzer, The Role
of Law in Arbitration: A Rejoinder, 21 NAT'L AcAb. OF ARBITRATORS 58 (1968);
Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and Labor Arbitration, 20 NAT'L
ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 1 (1967); Richard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, 21
NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 42 (1968); Michael I. Sovern, When Should Arbitrators
Follow Federal Law?, 23 NAT'L ACAD. OF ARBITRATORS 29 (1970); Theodore J. St.
Antoine, Discussion, 21 NAT'L AcAD. OF ARBITRATORS 75 (1968); see also Hayford &
Sinicropi, supra note 140, at 276-81 (discussing the external law debate in the context of
the public policy exception).
219 LAURA J. COOPER & DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR ARBITRATION: A COURSEBOOK
87 (1994) (citing Basic Patterns in Union Contracts 7 (13th ed. 1992) (stating that 97% of
collective bargaining agreements provide for discharge only for ·~ust cause" or "cause")).
220 See, e.g., Champion Int'I, 96 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 325, 328-30 (1991).
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with the law, or specifically, agreeing to comply with discrimination laws.221
While a full discussion of the question of authority to consider external law is
beyond the scope of this article, it is clear that upon agreement of the parties,
either expressly in the agreement or in the submission to the arbitrator, the
arbitrator can consider external law.222 If there is no such agreement
apparent, the arbitrator must determine the role of external law. 223 Many
arbitrators consider external law in determining what is just cause for
termination. 224 In such a situation, the arbitrator is using external law as an
interpretive aid to determine what the parties intended in the agreement.
Consideration of the law under such circumstances may vitiate a public
policy challenge and reversal, but only if both the employer and the court
agree with or defer to the arbitrator's interpretation of the law. In some cases,
however, the arbitrator's consideration of the law may lead to factual
findings that insulate the decision from challenge, such as in CWA. 225 Thus,
an arbitrator desiring a decision less amenable to judicial reversal may want
to consider the legal implications of the arbitration award. If the arbitrator
chooses not to consider the law and reinstates the employee, a public policy
challenge may be raised.
While arbitrators are not required to explain thoroughly the rationale for
their decisions, or even to write an opinion at all,226 a clear articulation of
factual findings and arbitral reasoning may minimize the possibility of
judicial review and reversaJ.227 Misco directs courts to defer to arbitral
findings of fact. However, lack of clarity of the findings may limit the
deference applied. If the arbitrator's reason for upholding the grievance is a
conclusion that the employee did not commit the alleged conduct, clear
specification of that determination will be helpful to the parties and the court.
221 See ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 171, at 548-49.
222 See Hayford & Sinicropi, supra note 140, at 280; ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra
note 171, at 534 (citing David E. Feller, Relationship of the Agreement to External Law,
LABOR ARBITRATION DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK 33 (1983)).
223 Hayford & Sinicropi, supra note 140, at 276-81 (arguing that arbitrators and
advocates must address the public policy dimensions of a dispute, including consideration
of external law, in order to assure finality).
224 E.g., Meltzer, Ruminations, supra note 219, at 14-15; Mallinckrodt, Inc., 83-2
Labor Arb. Awards (CCH) 'l[ 8358, 4591, 4597 (1983); Walker Mfg. Co., 81 Lab. Arb.
Rep. (BNA) 1169, 1174 (1983).
225 See supra notes 206-210 and accompanying text.
226 USW v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960).
227 For a suggestion of a framework for arbitral analysis of cases implicating public
policy, see Hayford & Sinicropi, supra note 140, at 282. The arbitrator might also
consider whether to make findings regarding whether or not the employee committed the
misconduct, even when the termination is reversed on other grounds. See supra notes
198-200 and accompanying text.
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If the arbitrator concludes that the conduct is unlikely to be repeated, he or
she should state that in the opinion, along with the reasons for the decision.
Such a conclusion might be based, inter alia, on the employee's lack of
intent, the lack of notice of any prohibition on the conduct, the application
and effectiveness of progressive discipline, completion of rehabilitation, or
the employee's prior work record.228 The parties are more likely to accept the
decision if the arbitrator's reasoning is clear and supported by the facts, and
the courts are more likely to defer to it. In the absence of a clear statutory or
regulatory prohibition on employment of an employee who has committed
the particular offense, and faced with a persuasively reasoned conclusion that
an employee is unlikely to repeat unlawful conduct, even an activist court
will be hard-pressed to find that reinstatement of the employee will violate
public policy.

B. Judicial Action
Once the arbitration decision overturning a discharge has issued, the
employer must decide whether to comply with the arbitration award or
whether to file an action to vacate. If the employer refuses to comply with the
arbitration award, but files no action to vacate, the union must file an
enforcement action. In either case, the action would be brought under Section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act,229 or under the Railway Labor
Act if the employer is an airline or railroad. 230
Although suits under§ 301 can be filed in either state or federal court,231
most actions are filed in federal court. An action filed in state court could be
removed to federal court by the defendant. 232 Because the public policy
standard applied by the court has a significant impact on the outcome of the
decision, the employer and the union may want to consider where to file an
action for enforcement or vacation of the arbitration award. 233 The employer
228 See supra notes 202-218 and accompanying text.
229 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994); see also USW v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 577-78 (1960).
230 45 U.S.C. § 153(m), (p), (q) (1994 & Supp. 1997).
231 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962).
232 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1994).
233 The Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
Workers, District 17 might render the choice of forum irrelevant. 66 F. Supp. 2d 796
(S.D. W. Va. 1998), a.ff'd, 188 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 1416
(2000). If the Court decides that the public policy exception justifies invalidation of an
arbitration award only when it violates positive law, then there will be little, if any, room
for circuit differentiation in application of the exception. On the other hand, if the court
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has more control over the initial filing since it makes the decision regarding
compliance or cha1lenge. While the union could file an action for
enforcement immediately upon receipt of the arbitration award to control the
forum, the suit would be unnecessary if the employer chose to comply with
the arbitration award. In addition, it might prompt an action to vacate.23 4
Thus, the union is likely to await the employer's decision about compliance,
which provides the employer with an opportunity to file an action to vacate
the arbitration award in the chosen jurisdiction. However, the jurisdictiona1
choices are not unlimited.
Section 301 provides that actions may be brought in any district court
having jurisdiction of the parties.235 Thus, venue would be proper in any
court that has personal jurisdiction over the party being sued. Section 301
contains a special jurisdiction provision for suits by or against labor
organizations in federal district courts. 236 The provision states that "district
courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the
district in which such organization maintains its principa1 office, or (2) in any
district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in
representing or acting for employee members."237 The Supreme Court has
recognized that under this provision venue is proper in any district in which
jurisdiction applies.238 And the Court has held that venue under the Railway
Labor Act is the same as that under § 301. 239 To obtain jurisdiction, the
employer would have to properly serve the union under Rule 4 of the Federal

decides that a broader exception applies, there may remain variations in the application of
the standard among the circuits.
234 Due to the short statute of limitations for actions to vacate in many jurisdictions,
the union may want to wait until the statute has run before instituting an enforcement
action. SEID, Local 36 v. City Cleaning Co., 982 F.2d 89, 93-94 (3d Cir.1992) (stating
that defenses to enforcement of an arbitration award should be raised in an action to
vacate and if not raised before expiration of the statute of limitations, they cannot be
raised in a later proceeding for enforcement of the arbitration award); ILA, Local 953 v.
Cataneo, Inc., 990 F.2d 794, 800 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that employer could not assert,
in a later enforcement action, a defense that it could have raised in a motion to vacate
when the action to vacate was time-barred).
235 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994). In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the
Supreme Court held that § 301 is more than merely jurisdictional. 353 U.S. 448, 455
(1957). It requires the court to create substantive federal common law to decide the
merits of disputes brought under this section. Id. at 456-57.
236 29 U.S.C. § 185(c) (1994).
237 Id.
238 Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556, 562-63
(1967).
239 Id.
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Rules of Civil Procedure.240 Section 301 permits service on any officer or
agent of the union.241 Based on these provisions ·the employer could sue the
union defendant in the jurisdiction where the dispute arose, in the jurisdiction
in which the union maintains its principal office, or anywhere that the union
is acting as a representative of employees.242 In cases involving an
international union, this rule might provide the employer with a number of
options. When only a local union is involved in the dispute, the options will
almost certainly be quite limited, as a local union is far less likely to have a
principal office or even represent employees outside the district in which the
dispute arose.
The union suing an employer must file the action in a court with
jurisdiction over the employer. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(l)
provides that service of process creates jurisdiction so long as a state court
would have jurisdiction, thereby incorporating the minimum contacts
analysis under the 14th amendment. 243 In the jurisdiction in which the
dispute leading to the arbitration award arose, jurisdiction over the employer
will undoubtedly lie as the employer operates its business there, providing
sufficient contacts, and the claim arises from those contacts.244 A suit in
which the employer is incorporated would most likely be jurisdictionally
proper under notions of "general jurisdiction."245 If decisions regarding labor
relations matters are made at a corporate level, an action in which the
corporate headquarters is located may be proper as well.246 In other
jurisdictions in which the employer does business, the argument for
jurisdiction becomes more tenuous. While the employer may have sufficient
contacts with the forum, the lack of a relationship between the contacts and
240 FED. R. Crv. P. 4.
241 29 u.s.c. § 185(d) (1994).
242 In any of· these locations the jurisdictional provmons would withstand
constitutional scrutiny because the union would have sufficient contacts. See Int'! Shoe
Co. v. Washington, ~26 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (requiring that a defendant have sufficient
minimum contacts with a forum so that ''fair play and substantial justice" would not be
offended by the assertion of jurisdiction (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463
(1940))).
243 FED. R. CIV. P. 4; lnt'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
244 Helicopteros Naciona1es de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984).
245 Id. at 414-15 n.9 (defining general jurisdiction as jurisdiction asserted when the
defendant has such pervasive contacts with the forum state that jurisdiction over a claim
unrelated to those contacts is justified); cf. Milliken v. Meyer, 311U.S.457, 462 (1940)
(stating that domicile is sufficient to bring absent citizen within personal jurisdiction of
the court).
246 In that case, the union could establish that the claim arose out of the contacts
with the forum. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at414.
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the claim may defeat jurisdiction unless the contacts are sufficiently
"continuous and systematic. "247
If the action is filed in a court that is either improper or substantially less
convenient for the defendant than another appropriate venue, the defendant
can request a change of venue and the district court can transfer the action for
the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interests of justice.248 fu
ruling on the request for transfer, the court considers whether there would be
personal jurisdiction in the transferee district, whether venue would have
been proper if the action were filed there originally, and whether service of
process would be possible in the transferee district.249 The transfer motion
will be denied if the action could not have been brought in the transferee
court originally.250 The plaintiffs choice of forum is a factor to be
considered in determining whether to grant the transfer. 251
If the case is transferred pursuant to § 1404 to a more convenient forum,
the question arises as to the law to be applied if the transferee court has
interpreted the public policy section differently than the transferor court.252
While the Supreme Court has held that in diversity cases the laws of the state
of the transferor court must be applied,253 the Court has not decided whether
the same rule applies when the case involves a federal question. Several
lower courts have addressed the question in the context of venue transfers
pursuant to § 1407, which allows transfers in order to coordinate or
consolidate pretrial proceedings in cases involving common questions of
fact. 254 The courts in these cases have split. fu In re Korean Air Lines
Disaster, 255 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
decided that '"the transferee court [should] be free to decide a federal claim
247 Id. at 416-18.
248 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406 (1994).
249 JACKH. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., C!VILPROCEDURE § 2.17, at87 {3ded.1999).
250 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1994); Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1960)
(stating that the action "might have been brought" originally in the transferee court if the
plaintiff could have sued there, served the defendant, asserted personal jurisdiction, and
established proper venue without any waiver by the defendant).
251 15 CHARLES ALAN WRIGIIT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3848, at
375-76 (2d ed. 1986).
252 For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Richard L. Marcus, Conflicts Among
Circuits and Transfers Within the Federal Judicial System, 93 YALE L.J. 677 (1984).
25 3 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 621 (1964); see also Ferens v. John Deere
Co., 494 U.S. 516, 519 (1990) (stating that same rule applies when plaintiff rather than
defendant initiated the transfer).
254 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994). For discussion of the cases, see infra notes 256-61 and
accompanying text.
255 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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in the manner it views as correct without deferring to the interpretation of the
transferor circuit. "'25 6 The court, in an opinion by current Justice, then Judge,
Ruth B. Ginsburg relying on Professor Marcus's article in the Yale Law
Review, concluded that the Van Dusen rule for diversity cases was motivated
by considerations of judicial competence that dictated a different result in
federal question cases.257 Federal courts have the competency and the duty to
decide federal law issues and should not accept, without independent review,
the interpretation of another court outside their chain of direct review. 258 By
way of contrast, in diversity cases the issues involve state law, and there is no
federal principle by which to select the state law that is to govern in diversity
cases.259
Other courts have reached a different result, finding no reason to apply a
different principle in federal question cases.260 Since a plaintiff in a diversity
case can choose a venue that provides favorable law and then take the law
along when venue transfers, plaintiffs in federal question cases arguably
should have the same right when the law differs by circuit.
Since § 1407 contemplates that these cases would be returned to their
original district for trial, it might be argued that a different rule regarding the
applicable law should apply to transfers under § 1404.261 A transfer under
§ 1404 which required the transferee court to apply the law of the transferor
court would require the transferee court to disregard the law of the circuit, or
the circuit court on appeal to ignore its own precedent.262 But in § 1404
cases, the courts also have split, essentially along the same lines.263
256 Id. at 1174 (quoting Marcus, supra note 253, at 721); accord Satellite Fin.
Planning Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank of Wilmington, 633 F. Supp. 386, 393-94 (D. Del.
1986).
257 In re Korean Airline Disaster, 829 F.2d at 1175.
258 Id. (quoting Marcus, supra note 253, at 702).

259 Id.
260 E.g., In re: The Dow Co. "Sarabond" Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 1466,
1469 (D. Colo. 1987); In re United Mine Workers Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F.
Supp. 914, 921-22 (D.D.C. 1994); see also In re Plumbing Fixtures Litig., 342 F. Supp.
756, 758 (J.P.M.L. 1972) (transferring case under§ 1407 despite plaintiffs concern that
the transferee court would not apply law of transferor court because the panel thought it
clear that the transferor court's law would apply).
261 In re: Dow, 666 F. Supp. at 1469.
262 Satellite Fin. Planning, 633 F, Supp. at 393-94.
263 Compare Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (7th Cir.
1993) (stating "when the law of the United States is geographically non-uniform, a
transferee court should use the rule of the transferor forum in order to implement the
central conclusion of Van Dusen and Ferens: that a transfer under Section 1404(a)
accomplishes 'but a change of courtrooms."' (citing Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612,

143

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol.16:12000)

Thus, in determining where to file, the parties must not only consider
whether they can obtain jurisdiction, and thus venue, in a jurisdiction where
the law is favorable, but also whether, if the case is transferred to a more
convenient forum with less favorable law, that forum will apply the
substantive law of the transferor court. This issue might also arise with
respect to the statute of limitations, since many circuits have applied the most
analogous state statute of limitations.264
Consider the following example. The arbitration award is issued in
Pennsylvania, where the employer's unionized facility, which gave rise to the
grievance, is located. However, the employer is headquartered in West
Virginia. The international union, which is a party to the contract and
participated in the arbitration, represents employees in both states. If the
employer seeks to overturn an unfavorable arbitration award, a Pennsylvania
court located in the Third Circuit would be more favorable than a West
Virginia court located in the Fourth. The Pennsylvania statute of limitations
for vacating arbitration awards is thirty days, 265 while the Fourth Circuit has
applied a three-month statute in West Virginia cases. 266 If the employer
missed the statute of limitations in Pennsylvania and filed in West Virginia,
the union would be unlikely to seek a change of venue. Suppose the situation
were reversed, with the facility in West Virginia and the headquarters in
Pennsylvania. If the employer filed a timely action in Pennsylvania, the
union might well seek a change of venue despite its presence in
Pennsylvania. If the court were to grant the motion, moving the case to West
Virginia where the facility is located for the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, the decision as to what substantive law to apply might determine
the outcome of the case.
If the union filed the enforcement action under either scenario, it would
certainly prefer to file in West Virginia. Venue would appear to be proper
there under the second scenario as the facility that gave rise to the arbitration
award is located in West Virginia. Under the first scenario, the employer

639 (1964))) with Garrel v. NYLCARE Health Plans, Inc., 98 Civ. 9077, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9778 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 1999) (awarding transfer based on the doctrine of forum
non conveniens rather than improper venue, court states that defendants' fears that the
transferee court will apply the substantive law of the transferor court in a federal question
case are "unfounded" since Van Dusen relies on the Erie doctrine and federal law is
uniform) and Satellite Fin. Planning, 633 F. Supp. at 393-94.
264 l THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 972 & n.112 {Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed.
1992); THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 448-49 {Christopher N. Hexter, et al. eds., 3d ed.
Supp. 1999).
265 SEIU, Local 36 v. City Cleaning Co., 982 F.2d 89, 93 (3d Cir. 1992).
266 Sheet Metal Workers Int'I Ass'n, Local Union No. 33 v. Power City Plumbing &
Heating, Inc., 934 F.2d 557, 560 (4th Cir. 1991).
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might have insufficient relevant contacts with the West Virginia forum
unless the corporate headquarters participated in labor relations.
Accordingly, the case might be dismissed or transferred. Even if venue was
proper in West Virginia, a change of venue for forum non conveniens might
relocate the case to Pennsylvania under the scenario in which the facility is
located there. Again· the court's decision about which substantive law to
apply, the transferee court's or the transferor court's, could be determinative.
In addition, the statute of limitations would be six years in Pennsylvania, but
only one year in West Virginia.267 Accordingly, if the union missed the
statute in West Virginia, it would have to file in Pennsylvania or find another
court in which venue would be proper. If, as is often the case, the employer
was incorporated in Delaware, the union would still face the broad standard
of review in the Third Circuit.. Under a national collective bargaining
agreement that applied in oth~r jurisdictions, the union might be able to
obtain jurisdiction over the employer in another circuit.
Unquestionably, both the union and the employer must be alert to these
issues and aware of the time limits for filing and of the jurisdictional and
venue options in order to take advantage of the most favorable law available.

VII. THE NONUNION WORKPLACE
Given the continuing proliferation of arbitration in the nonunion
sector,268 a determination of whether the foregoing analysis provides any
insight into nonunion employment arbitration is appropriate. Employees and
employers may voluntarily agree to arbitrate claims arising out of
employment even when no µnion is present. In addition, more employers are
requiring employees to agree to arbitration as a condition of employment.269
A discharge arbitration in the nonunion setting might involve an allegation
that an employer breache~ a contractual requirement of just cause or an
allegation that a termination violated a federal or state discrimination statute.

267 Both West Virginia and Pennsylvania have relfltively lengthy statutes of
limitations for contract enforcement actions. SEW, Local 36, 982 F. 2d at 95 (stating that
six years is the appropriate statute of limitations); Dist 1199, Health Care & Soc. Servs.
Union v. Coordinated Council for Indep. Living, 919 F. Supp. 946, 953 (N.D. W. Va.
1996) (ruling that the statute of limitations for enforcement of arbitration awards is the
one year time period from the United States Arbitration Act, rather than West Virginia's
contract enforcement statute or the six month statute from the National Labor Relations
Act).
268 RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 1-2 (1997).
269 Id.
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If the arbitration reinstated the employee under either circumstance, an action
for enforcement or vacation similar to those arising out of collectively
bargained arbitration agreements could be filed. 210

A. Judicial Review
The standard of review for employment arbitration decisions outside the
collective bargaining context is unsettled. While most courts have
determined that employment arbitration is encompassed in the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA),271 not all courts have agreed because of the
employment contract exception contained in the statute. 272 The Supreme
Court did not decide the issue in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
when it held that a plaintiff's agreement to arbitrate all claims arising out of
employment encompassed his statutory age discrimination claim. 273 If
employment arbitration cases are not governed by the FAA, they will be
governed by state law.274
The statutory grounds for review in the FAA are extremely narrow. The
four statutory grounds upon which an arbitration award may be vacated are:
(1) the arbitration award was "procured by corruption, fraud or undue
27o E.g., PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 351-52 (8th Cir. 1995)
(involving contractual just cause provision); Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 916 F.
Supp. 638, 643-44 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (involving statutory discrimination claims),
vacated on other grounds, 103 F.3d 35 (6th Cir. 1996).
271 BALES, supra note 269, at 44-48 (noting that most courts have interpreted the
exclusion for contracts of employment (quoted infra note 273) to cover only those
workers involved directly in interstate commerce such as transportation workers).
272 Section 1 of the FAA states: "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of
employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other class of worker engaged
in ... interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). For discussions of the scope of the
exception, see BALES, supra note 269, at 30-59; Robert N. Covington, Employment
Arbitration After Gilmer: Have Labor Courts Come to the United States?, 15 HOFS1RA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 345, 359-70 (1998); Matthew W. Finkin, "Workers' Contracts" Under
the United States Arbitration Act: An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 282, 289, 297 (1996); Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory
Employment Claims in the Aftermath of Gilmer, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 77, 88-91 (1996);
Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the
Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 226-34 (1992).
273 500 U.S. 20, 20-22 (1991). Because Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate was
contained in a securities registration agreement, it was not a part of a contract of
employment; therefore, the Court did not have to determine the scope of the FAA's
exclusion for contracts of employment. Id. at 25 n.2. However, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 120 S. Ct. 2004 (2000), to determine
the scope of the FAA's exclusion for employment contracts.
274 Malin, supra note 273, at 91.
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means"; (2) the arbitrator was corrupt or partial; (3) the arbitrator was guilty
of prejudicial misconduct such as refusing to hear material evidence or to
postpone the hearing when good cause is shown; or (4) the arbitrator
exceeded his or her powers, "or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual,
final, and definite arbitration award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made."275 The Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which has been adopted
in some form by a majority of states, contains similar statutory grounds for
vacation of arbitration awards. 276 Despite the narrow statutory grounds for
review, the courts have added no:ristatutory bases for review. Professor
Hayford, reviewing appellate case law, has identified the following
nonstatutory grounds for vacatur in commercial arbitration cases: (1)
Arbitration awards in "manifest disregard" of the law; (2) Arbitration awards
in direct conflict with "public policy"; (3) "Arbitrary and capricious"
arbitration awards; (4) "Completely irrational" arbitration awards; and (5)
Arbitration awards that fail to draw their essence from the parties underlying
contract. 277 The latter standards suggest more substantive review than the
statutory standards, which, with the exception of the fourth sta:qdard,
regarding the arbitrator who exceeds authority, focus primarily on procedural
issues.278
In employment arbitration cases involving statutory claims, some courts
have applied the "manifest disregard of the law" standard.279 The public
policy exception has also been utilized by some courts reviewing
employment arbitration cases.280 Courts applying the public policy exception
275 9 U.S.C. § lO(a) (1994).
276 Stephen L. Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of
Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REV. 731, 739 n.14 (1996) (stating that 47
states have adopted some form of the UAA); Covington, supra note 273, at 368 (noting
that 30 states have adopted the Act, most without any change in the vacatur section).
277 Hayford, supra note 277, at 764. Hayford notes that only the Fourth Circuit has
limited itself to the statutory grounds for review. Id; see also Kenneth R. Davis, When
Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse, 45 BUFFALOL. REv: 49, 88-89 (1997).
278 See Davis, supra note 278, at 87-88. Some courts have linked the nonstatutory
grounds for review of commercial arbitration awards to the fourth statutory standard,
authorizing vacation of arbitration awards in which the arbitrator exceeded authority.
Hayford, supra note 277, at 756--63.
279 BALES, supra note 269, at 136. For example, in Cole v. Bums International
Security Services, 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997), the D.C. Circuit rejected a plaintiff's
attempt to resist arbitration on the basis of the limited scope for review of the arbitrator's
decision on a statutory discrimination claim, stating that review based on the "manifest
disregard of the law" standard would "ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted
and applied statutory law." Id. at 1487.
280 E.g., cases cited supra note 271. For a discussion of the application of the public
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in the commercial context, including the employment law context, have
utilized the standard developed in labor arbitration cases.281
There has been substantial scholarly debate about the appropriate scope
of review for employment arbitrations involving statutory claims. Some
commentators have favored de novo review of questions of law. 282 Others
have urged more limited review.283 Most of the commentary is focused on
arbitration of statutory claims. As noted, employment arbitration claims
might also involve purely contractual issues, and the arguments for more
extensive review are less compelling in that context.284
With respect to public policy issues, it might be argued that review under
either the de novo standard or the manifest disregard of the law standard
would obviate the need for a specific public policy review in employment
cases.285 The court reviewing the case de novo for errors of law would
certainly set aside an arbitration award that was illegal or mandated unlawful
conduct. Under the broader public policy review, however, public policy
issues not involving the statutory claim of the employee might arise. For
example, consider the employee in a safety-sensitive position terminated for
a positive drug test. A white employee alleges that the termination
constituted race discrimination, because African American employees who
tested positive were not terminated. 286 The arbitrator, finding disparate
treatment based on race, sets aside the termination and orders reinstatement.

policy exception in commercial law, see Hayford, supra note 277, at 779-85.
281 Davis, supra note 278, at 110 & n.326; Hayford, supra note 277, at 779-82; see
also cases cited supra note 271.
282 Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to
Gilmer, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1238, 1240 (1993). Commentators have also suggested
de novo review of all issues. See Covington, supra note 273, at 387-88.
283 BALES, supra note 269, at 137 (urging manifest disregard of the law standard);
Covington, supra note 273, at 398-410.
284 The strongest arguments for more extensive review of employment arbitration
cases evoke concern for the public interest in just and proper application of the law to
achieve the statutory goals. E.g., BALES, supra note 269, at 135; Malin, supra note 273, at
100-105; Malin & Ladenson, supra note 283, at 1226-38.
285 Hayford, supra note 277, at 783-84. Hayford suggests, that despite the
similarities in the standards, there are differences when the standards are appropriately
applied. Id. According to Hayford, the manifest disregard standard focuses on how the
arbitrator discovered and applied the law, while the public policy standard focuses on the
extent and effect of an arbitrator's error of law. Id.
286 See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (finding white
employees terminated for misappropriation of company property stated a claim for
discrimination under§ 1981 and Title VII because an African American employee who
engaged in the same conduct was not terminated).
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The employer files a motion to vacate the arbitration award, challenging both
the arbitrator's legal findings on the discrimination issue and the
reinstatement as violative of public policy. A review of the arbitrator's legal
determination of discrimination, whether de novo or based on the manifest
disregard standard, would not necessarily address the public policy issue
regarding reinstatement, particularly if it was not raised before or addressed
by the arbitrator. Accordingly, there is still a role for the public policy
standard to play in employment arbitration. Moreover, some courts have
applied the manifest disregard of the law standard to require that the
arbitrator be aware of the law and intentionally disregard it.287 If the
arbitrator misinterpreted or misapplied the law, the arbitration award would
not be subject to vacation.288 Under these circumstances., public policy
review might require vacation eyen when a manifest disregard standard did
not.
In an arbitration based on a just cause contract rather than a statutory
claim, the public policy standard also retains a role to play. For example, in
PaineWebber, Inc. v. Agron, an employee was terminated for signing a
client's name on an account transfer form with the client's consent.289 Based
on the employee's contract for termination for cause, the arbitrator found the
termination improper and ordered damages. 290 When the employer sought
review, the court, citing authority from labor arbitration cases, found no
"well defined and dominant policy ascertainable from 'laws and legal
precedents"' requiring honesty in the securities industry and further
concluded that, assuming there were such a policy, the arbitration award did
not violate the policy.291
We intimate no agreement with the arbitration panel's ruling. Indeed, the
panel's seeming willingness to prevent PaineWebber from strictly adhering
to proper procedures and ethical considerations in policing its own brokers
is troubling. Agron's actions were undeniably ill-conceived and in violation
of PaineWebber and NASD rules. However, PaineWebber has identified no
federal or state statutes, regulations, or judicial decisions that expose either

287 Hayford, supra note 277, at 777-78 (discussing the interpretation of manifest
disregard of the law by the courts) & n.224 (citing the discussion of the Eleventh Circuit
in Brown v. Rauscher Pierce Refsnes, Inc., 994 F.2d 775, 781-82 (11th Cir. 1993)
(distinguishing manifest disregard of the law from the public policy exception on this
·
basis)).
288 Hayford, supra note 277, at 777-78.
289 49 F.3d at 349.
290 Id. at 349-50.
2 9 1 Id. at 351.
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Agron's conduct, or, most importantly the arbitration ruling itself as
violative of a fundamental policy. Given our limited review, we cannot
supplant what we believe to be an improper decision without such a
showing. 292

In the nonunion arbitration context, if courts utilize the labor arbitration
public policy precedent, then the circuit differences in the standard will
persist. Currently, there are also circuit differences in interpretation of the
other standards of review under the FAA, so uniformity is hardly to be
expected on the public policy question unless the Supreme Court dictates a
narrow standard in Eastern Associated Coal, and such standard is applied to
employment arbitration.293 If circuit differences in the interpretation of the
public policy exception remain, a party seeking a favorable court for review
of an arbitration award must determine venue options. If employment
arbitration review comes under the FAA,294 § 10 provides that if the
standards for vacation of an arbitration award are met, the court "in and for
the district wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the
award upon application of any party to the arbitration ...."295 Similarly, § 9
provides for confirming arbitration awards by the "United States court in and
for the district within which such award was made" unless the arbitration
agreement specifies a different court.296 The Supreme Court recently held
that these venue provisions are permissive, not mandatory, and that venue is
appropriate in any court that is proper under the general venue statute. 297

292 /d. at 351-52 (citing United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S.
29, 43 (1987)).
293 See Hayford, supra note 277, at 746, 756, 764-65, 772-74, 777-78.
294 If the case arises under state arbitration law, the state statutory provisions would
control venue. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12-1516 (West 1994) (providing venue
is determined as it would be in any other civil action); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-84 (1982)
(providing venue is appropriate in the county specified in the agreement. If no county is
specified, the court in the county where the arbitration hearing was conducted or where
party resides or conducts business is appropriate); 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/17 (West
1993) (providing for venue in the court of the county provided in the agreement or the
county where the hearing was held); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.5031 (West 2000)
(providing that venue shall be in the circuit court of the county specified in the
agreement).
295 9 u.s.c. § 10 (1994).
296 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1994). Section 9 goes on to provide that "[n]otice of the application
shall be served upon the adverse party, and thereupon the court shall have jurisdiction of
such party as though he had appeared generally in the proceeding" and to specify the
manner of notice depending on the residency of the adverse party. Id.
297 Cortez Byrd Chips v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 120 S. Ct. 1331 (2000).
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The FAA, however, does not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the
federal courts.298 Accordingly, to file an action to confirm or vacate an
arbitration award in federal court, an employer or employee would have to
provide a basis for either federal question or diversity jurisdiction.299 A
number of courts have held that the federal nature of the arbitrated claim,
e.g., a federal statutory claim such as Title VII or the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, does not confer federal question jurisdiction in an action to
confirm or vacate the arbitration award.300 An alternative basis for
jurisdiction would be diversity, if the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000.301 Diversity jurisdiction would lie only if the employee and
employer were citizens of different states.302
The employee's citizenship is based on her domicile, which is her
residence if she intends to make it her present home.303 A corporation is a
citizen both where it is incorporated and where it maintains its principal
place of business.3 04 The principal place of business may be the site of the
corporate headquarters or the site of the major business operations, whether
production or service.305 If the employee is domiciled where the employer is
incorporated or where its principal place of business is located, diversity will

298 Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. l, 25n.32
(1983).

299 [d.
300 E.g., Collins v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 103 F.3d 35 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding no
federal jurisdiction over action to enforce arbitration award although underlying claim
was based on Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)); V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen.
Constr. Serv. Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 915-16 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding no federal jurisdiction
over action to vacate arbitrator's award involving contract to renovate housing project
financed with federal funds); Lipton v. Shearson, 934 F. Supp. 638, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding no federal jurisdiction over action to vacate arbitration award although
arbitration award involved federal securities law and Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (RICO)); O;Leary v. Fanghella, 866 F. Supp. 1119, 1120-21
(N.D. Ill. 1994) (holding no federal jurisdiction over action to confirm arbitration award
although underlying claim involved federal securities law); Giangrande v. Shearson
Lehman/E.F. Hutton, 803 F. Supp. 464, 468-74 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding no federal
jurisdiction over action to vacate arbitration award, despite fact that claims arbitrated
based on federal securities law).
301 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (Supp. IV 1999).
302 Id. This assumes that the employer and the employee are the only two parties to
the case. Complete diversity is required so if there are other parties, no plaintiff and
defendant can be citizens of the same state. FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 250, § 2.6, at 28.
303 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 250, § 2.6, at 29-30.
304 28 u.s.c~ § 1332(c) (1994).
·
305 FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 250, § 2.6 at 34-5 (discussing various tests).
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not lie. Diversity is determined as of the time an action is filed.3° 6
Accordingly, in an action under the FAA, the initial determination must be
made as to whether jurisdiction in the federal court exists. If federal
jurisdiction exists, appropriate venue must be determined.
The location where the arbitration award was made is clearly a venue
option for either the employer or the employee under the FAA, although
there may be an issue as to where the arbitration award was made. Courts
generally have found that the arbitration award was made where the
arbitration hearing was held, despite arguments that the arbitration award is
"made" where it is written, signed, and mailed by the arbitrator. 307
Under the general venue statute either the employer or the employee
could file an action where the defendant resided or where "a substantial part
of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred."308 If the
employer initiates an action, which is most often the case, the venue may be
limited, as often the hearing is held where the employee worked, which is
likely to be where the events that gave rise to the claim occurred and where
the employee resides. If not, the options increase. If the employee files the
action, he or she will have to discover the corporate residence to determine
whether it provides a different and better venue option than the location
where the claim arose or where the hearing was held (if they differ).
Although venue may be determined by the arbitration agreement, it is
unlikely that an employee would have sufficient foresight or bargaining
306 Id. § 2.5, at 27.
307 E.g., Motion Picture Lab. Technicians, Local 780 v. McGregor & Werner, Inc.,
804 F.2d 16, 16 (2d Cir. 1986); Cent. Valley Typographical Union No. 46 v. McClatchy
Newspapers, 762 F.2d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 1985); T & R Enterprises, Inc. v. Cont'! Grain
Co., 613 F.2d 1272, 1279 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that "made" is not necessarily
construed as the location where the arbitration award was signed, but rather where the
arbitration was held).
308 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1994), amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (Supp. IV 1999)
(diversity jurisdiction only); id. at § 1391(b) Gurisdiction not founded solely on
diversity). The venue provisions differ slightly depending on whether jurisdiction is
based on federal question or diversity. There is no difference with respect to the grounds
of residency of the defendant or the district where the events giving rise to the claim
arose. The difference lies in the third alternative where§ 1391(a) states: "or (3) a judicial
district in which any defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is
commenced, if there is no district in which the action may otherwise be brought." Section
1391(b) states: "or (3) a judicial district in which any defendant may be found, if there is
no district in which the action may otherwise be brought." These two provisions would
apply if there were no personal jurisdiction over the defendant in any other appropriate
venue, an unlikely situation in the circumstances that give rise to the actions that are the
subject of this discussion. Id. Cortez finds venue proper under the diversity provisions of
the general venue statute. 120 S. Ct. 1331, 1332 (2000).
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power to negotiate a favorable venue prior to any dispute. Moreover, a venue
favorable for public policy arguments might be unfavorable for other
reasons.
Given that the employee could not anticipate which disputes would arise,
venue control for public policy arguments by the employee is not likely to
occur. The employer who attempts to provide for venue in the agreement
faces the sallle difficulties, but will be more likely to foresee the issue and, if
desired, may specify venue in the agreement without employee constraint in
most circumstances.
Venue options may enable the moving party to find a favorable
jurisdiction. If venue is limited to a jurisdiction where the public policy law
relating to collectiveiy bargained agreements is unfavorable, and the court
has not spoken to the public policy issue in the employment arbitration
context, the employer or employee might argue for a standard that differs
from the labor arbitration standard. In the instant context, the employee
would argue for the narrow standard in order to uphold the favorable
arbitration award reversing termination, and the employer would support the
broad standard. When, as is often the case, the employer imposed the
arbitration agreement unilaterally, the employee might argue that a broad
standard allows the employer to require the employee to arbitrate, but then
refuse to abide by the result if it is unfavorable to. the employer.309 This
argument is unlikely to persuade a court which has adopted a broad standard
in order to guard the public interest, since the principle of holding the
employer to its arbitration commitment may not outweigh a risk to public,
patient, or worker safety.
More likely, the employer may persuade a court that has adopted the
narrow view in labor cases to consider the broad exception in the
employment context.310 The narrow standard furthers the national labor
policy favoring collective bargaining and peaceful settlement of disputes.311
Labor arbitration is the substitute for strikes rather than litigation. In addition,
unlike an arbitration dealing with statutory claims, the parties to a labor
309 The policy underlying the FAA is to enforce the parties'. bargain by holding them
to their agreements to arbitrate and limiting the ability to vacate arbitration awards.
Hayford, supra note 277, at 742.
310 Of course, the downside to this argument is that u~der many circumstances, the
employer may prefer narrow review in order to preserve favorable arbitration awards, but
arguments that differentiate labor arbitration from employment arbitration support
broader review generally. Malin & Ladenson, supra note 283, at 1219-38.
311 Frank H. Easterbrook, Arbitration, Contract and Public Policy, ARBITRATION
1991, THE CHANGING FACE OF ARBITRATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, 44 PROCEEDINGS
OF THE ANNUAL MEETING, N~T'L ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 65, 73 (1992).
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contract can renegotiate at contract expiration to correct any arbitral
errors.31 2 Thus, encouraging finality of arbitral decisions in labor cases
furthers a national policy that may be more compelling than any policy
supporting finality in employment cases. This is particularly true if the
arbitration deals with a statutory issue. 313 Thus, if a court is considering the
legal issues in any event, encouraging a broader review of the public policy
question is not a significant additional step.
If the only jurisdiction available under the FAA is state court, federal
substantive law will still apply314 and the same arguments can be made
regarding the applicable law.315 If, however, the state arbitration law applies,
rather than the FAA, the parties will need to look to state law. Some states
have addressed the public policy issue in the labor arbitration context under
state collective bargaining statutes, which typically apply to the public
sector.316 If that law is favorable, it can be cited. If not, both arguments that
employment arbitration differs from labor arbitration and arguments
differentiating the public sector from the private sector can be utilized.3 17

312 Malin & Ladenson, supra note 283, at 1228.
313 Id. at 1219-38.
314 Allied-Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (declining to
overrule Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1984), which held that the FAA
preempts state law); FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 250, at § 4.8, 241, (citing Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947)). The Supreme Court stated in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), however, that under the FAA courts should apply ordinary
principles of state contract law in determining whether the parties agreed to arbitrate an
issue. Id. at 944.
315 The state court may follow the law of the federal circuit in which it sits in order
to avoid forum shopping. Mech. Contractors Ass'n v. Greater Bay Area Ass'n of
Plumbing & Mech. Contractors, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 225 (1998). The parties can argue for
the most favorable law, however, urging the persuasive force of a particular view. In
addition, the distinction between labor and employment arbitration can be argued by the
party whom it benefits. See supra notes 309-14 and accompanying text; see also Tretina
Printing, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick & Assocs., Inc., 640 A.2d 788 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1994) (declining
to follow labor arbitration cases in dispute involving commercial arbitration because of
the different role that arbitration plays in labor law as the "heart of the system of
industrial self government").
3l6 See Hodges, supra note 57, at 665-74 and cases cited therein.
317 For arguments that arbitration awards require greater scrutiny in the public
sector, see Hodges, supra note 57, at 661-83. For the argument that the standards should
be the same and that the narrow public policy standard should apply in both sectors, see
id.
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B. The Arbitration
With respect to the arbitration, the guidance in Section VI.A. regarding
recognition of potential public policy cases and arguments to the arbitrator
applies equally to employment arbitration. The same issues that arise in labor
cases-drug and alcohol use, patient safety, violence, nuclear safety, and
sexual harassment-are likely to trigger public policy arguments in
employment cases. Assuming that the standards do not differ substantially,
arbitral factual findings regarding whether the employee committed the
offense and whether he or she is likely to repeat it, may be determinative of
the outcome. In-depth understanding by both parties of the potential legal
issues will enable them to tailor their arguments to the law. In addition,
thorough arbitral opinions with explanatory reasoning are more likely to be
upheld.318 In sum, employers, employees, their attorneys, and arbitrators in
employment cases, as in labor cases, must be alert to public policy issues and
the relevant law in their jurisdictions, in order to identify the issues and make
appropriate arguments at an early stage in any proceedings relating to
employee discharge.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

Judicial reversal of labor arbitration, awards undermines the finality of
the arbitration awards, thus thwarting national labor policy. Employers,
unions, and arbitrators should strive to insure finality by recognizing cases
that are likely to give rise to public policy issues and by addressing those
issues at the arbitration stage. The varying public po!icy standards of the
courts encourage the parties to seek judicial review. The Supreme Court has
an opportunity to settle the disagreement over the standard in Eastern
Associated Coal and should do so, adopting the narrow approach to further
the goal of finality. Public policy issues have begun to arise in employment
arbitration as well, and the similarities suggest similar approaches at the
arbitration stage for employers, employees, attorneys, and arbitrators.
Whatever the decision in Eastern Associated Coal, the ·parties, arbitrators,
and the courts will have to determine the appropriate role of public policy in
·,
employment arbitration.

3I81t has not been common practice for arbitrators in commercial cases in the
United States to write detailed arbitration awards. Hayford, supra note 277, at 734-35;
see also Covington, supra note 273, at 393-94 (discussing employment case upholding
arbitration award despite lack of findings of fact and explanatory rationale).
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